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NOTES
California's Nuclear Power Regulations:
Federal Preemption?
By Dan M Berkoviz*
Introduction
In 1976, California utilities envisioned the construction of thirty-
one large new nuclear power plants by 1994.1 Since that time, how-
ever, only two plants have been proposed, and construction plans for
both facilities have been scrapped.2 Lower than projected growth in
energy demand and the increased concern for safety after the incident
at the Three-Mile Island nuclear plant are partially responsible for this
moratorium But perhaps most importantly, California's nuclear
power regulations pose a practically insurmountable legal obstacle.
These regulations were passed in two stages. The Warren-Alquist
Act, enacted in 1974, contains licensing provisions applicable to all new
thermal power plants, including nuclear plants.' In 1976, three amend-
ments to the Act were passed to discourage the passage of Proposition
15, a voter initiative that would have eliminated nuclear power in Cali-
fornia for the foreseeable future.6 The amendments contain some fea-
* A.B., 1978, Princeton University; member, third year class. The author would like
to thank Kathryn Burkett Dickson for her invaluable help. All opinions and errors, how-
ever, are the author's.
1. The Nuclear Initiative: Hearings on Prop. 15 Before the California State Assembly
Comnz on Resources, Land Use, and Energy (1975) (Staff Background Papers §§ 1-2) [here-
inafter cited as Assembly Comm: Staff Background Papers].
2. See notes 188 & 246 and accompanying text infra.
3. Power demand has fallen off from a growth rate of about 7% a year in the early
1970's to about 3% in 1981. TIME, Oct. 26, 1981, at 19.
4. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 25500-25542 (West 1977 & Supp. 1981).
5. Warren-Alquist State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Act, CAL.
Pun. RES. CODE §§ 25000-25968 (West 1977 & Supp. 1981). Sections 25500-25542 contain
the thermal power plant siting regulations. See notes 85-118 and accompanying text infra.
6. Proposition 15, § 1 (proposed CAL. GOV'T CODE § 67503(b)(2)), reprinted in CALI-
FORNIA ASSEMBLY COMM. ON RESOURCES, LAND USE, AND ENERGY, REASSESSMENT OF
NUCLEAR ENERGY IN CALIFORNIA: A POLICY ANALYSIS OF PROPOSITION 15 AND ITS AL-
TERNATIVES 154 (1976). Proposition 15 failed, and in its place were enacted CAL. PUB. RES.
CODE §§ 25524.1-.3 (West 1977 & Supp. 1981). See note 175 and accompanying text infra.
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tures of Proposition 15, yet allow the continued operation of existing
nuclear power plants. The most controversial of these amendments,
California Public Resources Code section 25524.2, conditions the certi-
fication of new nuclear power plants upon the existence of a federally
approved waste disposal technology for high level nuclear wastes.
Since this technology does not presently exist and is not expected to
exist until the mid-1990's,7 section 25524.2 effectively bans the certifica-
tion of new nuclear power plants in California.
Unhappy with the foreclosure of the nuclear option, two Califor-
nia utilities, Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (PG&E) and Southern Califor-
nia Edison (SCE), have challenged the constitutionality of certain
provisions of the Warren-Alquist Act and the 1976 amendments.8
They have argued that California statutes regulating nuclear power are
preempted by the federal nuclear regulatory scheme created under the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954. This position prevailed in a federal district
court, where California's statutes were held unconstitutional; 9 however,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed that
decision. In Pacjic Legal Foundation v. State Energy Resources Conser-
7. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT BY THE INTERAGENCY REVIEW GROUP ON NUCLEAR
WASTE MANAGEMENT 35 (1979) [hereinafter cited as IRG REPORT].
8. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n,
489 F. Supp. 699 (E.D. Cal. 1980), rev'd sub nonm Pacific Legal Found. v. State Energy
Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 659 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50
U.S.L.W. 3994 (U.S. June 22, 1982) (No. 81-1945). The provisions that Pacific Gas & Elec-
tric Co. (PG&E) challenged are CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 25500, 25502, 25503, 25504, 25511,
25512, 25514, 25516, 25517, 25519, 25520, 25523, 25524.1-.3, 25528, 25532. 489 F. Supp. at
703.
After this note had gone to press, the United States Supreme Court granted PG&E's
petition for a writ of certiorari. The Court limited the questions presented, however, to the
following: (1) Are petitioner's challenges to § 25524.1(b) and § 25524.2 ripe for judicial re-
view?; and (2) Are §§ 25524.1(b) and 25524.2 preempted by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954?
50 U.S.L.W. 3994.
In another action, the Pacific Legal Foundation, a public interest law foundation,
brought an independent suit on behalf of a number of other plaintiffs who also sought to
challenge California's nuclear power regulations. Pacific Legal Found. v. State Energy Re-
sources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 472 F. Supp. 191 (S.D. Cal. 1979), rev'd, 659 F.2d
903 (9th Cir. 1981).
Pacific Legal Foundation was consolidated with Pacfic Gas & Elec. Co. on appeal in the
Ninth Circuit, but the Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred in giving summary
judgment to the Pacific Legal Foundation plaintiffs on the question of standing and therefore
reversed and remanded that case back to the district court. Although the Supreme Court has
agreed to review part of the Ninth Circuit's Pacfic Gas & Elec. Co. decision, it declined to
disturb that court's disposition of the Pacfic Legal Foundation case. Hence, this note will
focus on the PG&E case in the Ninth Circuit, although it will be referred to by its official
name in that court, Pacific Legal Foundation v. State Energy Resources Conservation and
Development Commission.
9. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n,
489 F. Supp. 699 (E.D. Cal. 1980).
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vation & Development Commission,10 the appellate court held that only
two of the statutes were ripe for review: California Public Resources
Code sections 25503 and 25524.2. The former requires a utility propos-
ing to build a new thermal power plant to submit three possible sites
for the plant. The latter conditions plant certification on the existence
of a method for the disposal of high level nuclear waste. The court
held that states may regulate nuclear power under the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 for any purpose except protection from radiation hazards
associated with the production of nuclear power. The court found that
California's three-site requirement was environmentally motivated and
therefore held that section 25503 was not preempted. More significant,
however, was its decision to uphold section 25524.2. The court found
that section's central purpose to be economically motivated. It observed
that the waste disposal requirement was necessary to prevent the fuel
cycle from "clogging" by not having any place to put the spent fuel
produced in the core of the reactor, thereby causing premature closing
of the plant.
Although the court's reasoning is substantially sound, its conclu-
sion that the waste disposal provision is economically motivated is
questionable. The court failed to critically examine the statute's actual
operation; instead it accepted statements of legislative intent at face
value. This note examines the court's holding and concludes that sec-
tion 25524.2 is actually a safety provision and therefore should have
been held to be preempted.
The decision, nevertheless, is significant in that it provides prece-
dent for other states that attempt to impose dejure moratoria on nu-
clear power plant construction by passing legislation similar to that of
California. Because the Ninth Circuit's analysis of these laws is subject
to strong criticism, states wishing to impose moratoria must be cautious
in adopting regulatory provisions similar to those contested in Pacfc
Legal Foundation.
This note first briefly reviews the doctrine of preemption. It then
discusses the federal concern, expressed through the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954, for regulation of nuclear power plants and juxtaposes this
federal regulatory scheme against that of California. In order to under-
stand the motives behind the California statutes, this note explains ba-
sic aspects of the production of nuclear power. Finally, the Ninth
Circuit's opinion in Pafc Legal Foundation is critically examined,
particularly its use of the ripeness and preemption doctrines in analyz-
ing the constitutionality of California's statutory scheme.
10. 659 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3997 (U.S. June 22, 1982)
(No. 81-1944).
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I. Preemption
The constitutional challenge to California's regulation of nuclear
power rests on the supremacy clause." Under certain circumstances,
the supremacy clause requires state law to yield to federal law. Over
the years, the Supreme Court has articulated various standards to de-
termine whether or not state law is preempted. In order to determine
whether or not California's regulation of nuclear power is constitu-
tional, it is therefore necessary to examine these standards, including
the Court's most recent pronouncements.
The doctrine of preemption was first enunciated by Chief Justice
Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden, 2 where the Court ruled that valid exer-
cises of state power must yield if the state law conflicts with acts of
Congress. 13 The early preemption cases, such as Gibbons, arose from
state interference with interstate commerce. Since 1941, however, state
laws have been preempted in numerous other areas.1 4 Despite this ex-
pansion in fields subject to federal preemption, the Supreme Court
more recently has interpreted the doctrine to favor the states.' 5
A. Express Preemption
Preemption is easily recognized where Congress explicitly sets
forth in the statute what the states may or may not do. For example, in
Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co. ,16 the Supreme Court held that the portion
of Washington State's Tanker Law that required enrolled tankers to
have a pilot licensed by the state while navigating Puget Sound was
11. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in pur-
suance thereof.., shall be the supreme Law of the Land;.. . any Thing in the Constitu-
tion or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
12. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
13. Id at 210. Earlier cases, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316
(1819), had ruled that states had no authority at all in certain areas expressly regulated by
the federal government.
14. See, e.g., Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971),
aft'dmen, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972) (construction and operation of nuclear power plants); Perez
v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971) (bankruptcy law); Nash v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 389
U.S. 235 (1967) (labor law); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964) (patent
law); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962) (right of survivorship in United States bonds);
Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956) (sedition laws); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S.
52 (1941) (regulation of aliens).
15. The Court will not find preemption "in the absence of pervasive reasons--either
that the nature of the regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion, or that the Con-
gress has unmistakably so ordained." Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373
U.S. 132, 142 (1963).
For a discussion of the trend of the Burger Court to favor the states, see Note, The
Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger Court, 75 COLUiM.
L. REy. 623 (1975). See also Catz & Lenard, he Demise of the Implied Federal Preemption
Doctrine, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 295 (1977).
16. 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
[Vol. 9:623
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expressly preempted by federal regulations stating that "'no State or
municipal government shall impose upon pilots of steam vessels any
obligation to procure a State or other license in addition to that issued
by the United States .... ' "117 In such cases, the only issue is whether
or not "the legislative measure adopted is relevant or appropriate to the
constitutional power which Congress exercises.""'
B. Implied Preemption
Often Congress neither foresees nor contemplates concurrent state
action when it regulates an area. Courts therefore must determine
whether or not Congress implicitly intended the regulations to be ex-
clusive. Implied preemption may occur when there is a conflict be-
tween state and federal laws or when the federal law occupies the field
in which the state law regulates.
1. Conflict
Implied preemption of a state statute occurs when state and fed-
eral statutes are in actual conflict; that is, when compliance with both is
a "physical impossibility,"' 9 so that to uphold the state law would de-
feat the purpose of the federal law.20 Both the purpose and merit of a
state statute are irrelevant when the law is in actual conflict with a fed-
eral statute.21
Although state and federal laws may not be in actual conflict, the
Court has found implied preemption when the state law is merely an
"obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress."' 22 This occurs, for example, when the state
"discourage[s] conduct that federal action *seeks to encourage" 23 or
when the state imposes requirements that are more stringent than or
are in addition to those which Congress has adopted.24
17. Id at 159 (quoting 46 U.S.C. § 215 (1976)).
18. Railway Employee's Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 234 (1956).
19. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
20. "If the purpose of the [federal] act cannot otherwise be accomplished-if its opera-
don within its chosen field else must be frustrated and its provisions be refused their natural
effect-the state law must yield to the regulation of Congress," Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S.
501, 533 (1912).
21. "The relative importance to the State of its own law is not material when there is a
conflict with a valid federal law." Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962). See also Frank-
lin Nat'l Bank v. New York, 347 U.S. 373 (1954). Purpose is relevant, however, in other
preemption situations. See notes 38-44 and accompanying text infra.
22. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
23. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 378 (1978).
24. For example, in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978), the Court also
examined the sections of Washington's Tanker Law that required enrolled and registered oil
tankers from 40,000 to 125,000 dwt. either to have certain safety features or to be escorted
into Puget Sound by tugs. The Court found that part of the congressional purpose in enact-
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The use of implied preemption analysis has led to an expansion of
the preemption doctrine's application to many areas of governmental
regulation.25 Moreover, until the recent past, the Court found preemp-
tion of a state law when conflict with federal law was a mere possibil-
ity.26  Now, however, the Court demands at least a substantial
possibility of conflict.27
2. Occupation of the Field
When Congress mandates that its regulations in an area shall be
exclusive, it preempts state law in that area by "occupation of the
field." Express preemption is a clear form of occupation of the field.
Whether or not a statute impliedly occupies the field is a more difficult
question.
Courts have found preemption through the doctrine of implied oc-
cupation of the field by examining the legislative history of the federal
statute,28 by considering the pervasiveness of the federal scheme, 29 by
considering whether or not the nature of the subject matter demands
national uniformity,3° and by determining whether or not the state laws
have the same purposes and objectives as those of the federal scheme. 1
These factors were first identified in 1947 in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp. 32 and have been cited often by the Court since.
33
C. Current Trends
The current trend in the Supreme Court is to uphold state statutes
whenever possible. The Court accomplishes this by trying to "reconcile
ing the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 was to set uniform national standards for
the construction and design of tankers. Id at 163. The Court held that while the tankers
could have complied with both federal and state laws, the state's more stringent standards
interfered with the congressional goal of national uniformity. Thus, the federal law pre-
empted the Washington law. Id at 165, 168.
25. See note 14 and accompanying text supra. This expansion has been halted by the
Burger Court. See notes 34-46 and accompanying text infra.
26. See, e.g., San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 246 (1959)
("danger of conflict" as basis for preemption). But see Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533
(1912) (operation of federal law "must be frustrated" as basis for preemption).
27. See notes 35-44 infra.
28. See, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 153 (1963).
29. See, e.g., City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973);
Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 272 U.S. 605 (1926).
30. See, e.g., Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767
(1947); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
31. See, e.g., Charleston & W.C. Ry. Co. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597, 604
(1915) (when Congress has regulated a field, "coincidence [of the subject matter of state and
federal regulations] is as ineffective as opposition").
32. 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
33. Recently, however, the Court has disfavored the doctrine of implied preemption.
See, e.g., Department of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973).
[Vol. 9:623
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'the operation of both statutory schemes rather than holding one com-
pletely ousted,' 34 by requiring actual, rather than possible, conflict,
35
and by requiring that federal statutes express a direct intent to exclude
state regulation.36 Just as the expansion of the grounds for preemption
led to the expansion of the fields of preemption, this narrowing of the
bases for preemption has resulted in finding it in fewer contexts.37
In attempting to reconcile the operation of state and federal statu-
tory schemes, the Court has permitted state law to tread upon areas of
exclusive federal control, provided that the purpose for which the state
enacted its law is not preempted and that the state does not exclude
federally licensed activity.
38
The United States Supreme Court decision in Perez v. Campbell39
has often been cited to support the contrary position: that purpose is
irrelevant in all cases of conflict between two laws. Perez involved an
Arizona law that required uninsured motorists who had not satisfied
34. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 127 (1973)
(quoting Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963)).
35. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 554 (1973).
36. Department of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413 (1973).
37. Compare the following cases, involving interstate commerce, in which state laws
were preempted, Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978) (state regulation of fed-
erally licensed oil tankers); Douglas v. Seacoast Prod., Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977) (Virginia
statute that prohibited certain federally licensed fishing vessels from fishing in Virginia's
coastal waters); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977) (California law that imposed
food labeling requirements different from those of federal law); and City of Burbank v.
Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973) (Burbank city ordinance that put an 11
p.m. to 7 a.m. curfew on jet flights from the Burbank airport); with cases not involving
interstate commerce, in which state laws were not preempted, e.g., Aronson v. Quick Point
Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979) (state regulation of intellectual property); De Canas v. Bica,
424 U.S. 351 (1976) (California prohibition on employment of illegal aliens when such em-
ployment would have an adverse impact on lawful resident workers); Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974) (Ohio's trade secret law protected information that federal
patent laws did not protect); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S.
117 (1973) (wage relief provisions of California's labor code conflicted with New York Stock
Exchange arbitration rules promulgated pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act); Goldstein
v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973) (California's tape and record piracy law protected record-
ings that federal copyright laws did not protect); and Department of Social Servs. v. Dub-
lino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973) (New York's work rules imposed more stringent eligibility
requirements on welfare recipients than did the federal rules). See also Note, supra note 15.
38. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974) (Court reconciled
asserted conflict of federal patent laws with state trade secret laws by examining their opera-.
tion and objectives and concluding that state regulatory scheme was just another incentive to
encourage invention and did not threaten the operation of federal law); Huron Portland
Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960) (Court held municipal ordinance requir-
ing smoke abatement devices on ships not preempted by federal licensing which did not
require them, reasoning that federal regulations were necessary to protect vessel safety while
purpose of municipal ordinance was to protect local population; the provisions were there-
fore not in conflict because of different objectives).
39. 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
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judgments against them or had failed to pay settlements after accidents
to prove their financial responsibility before the state would license
them to drive again. The Arizona law, contrary to the Federal Bank-
ruptcy Act, specified that this obligation would not be discharged in
bankruptcy. In earlier cases involving similar statutes in other states,
the Court had held that since the purpose of such laws was to deter
irresponsible driving rather than to aid in the collection of debts, they
would not be preempted.40 Notwithstanding such precedent, the Court
in Perez rejected purpose as a guide4 and preempted the conflicting
state law.42
Perez, however, is really a case of actual conflict: Compliance
with both statutes would be impossible. Perez holds merely that the
purpose of a state statute is irrelevant when that statute is in actual
conflict with a federal statute.43 Thus, the Court will find preemption
of state statutes that actually conflict with federal statutes but will look
to purpose when there is only a possibility of conflict. If there is only a
possibility of conflict, the state statute will be upheld as long as it was
not enacted for a preempted purpose (i.e., expressly preempted).'
40. Kesler v. Department of Pub. Safety, 369 U.S. 153 (1962); Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S.
33 (1941).
41. 402 U.S. at 651-52. The holding of purpose as irrelevant, however, was confined to
an overruling of Kessler v. Department of Pub. Safety, 369 U.S. 153 (1962), and Reitz v.
Mealy, 314 U.S. 33 (1941). The Court found it could "no longer adhere to the aberrational
doctrine of Kesler and Reitz that state law may frustrate the operation of federal law as long
as the state legislature in passing its law had some purpose in mind other than one of frustra-
tion." Perez, 402 U.S. at 651-52. The Court went on to suggest ways in which a devious
state legislature could take advantage of a ruling to the contrary, commenting that "[the
Kesler-Reitz] doctrine would enable state legislatures to nullify nearly all unwanted federal
legislation by simply publishing a legislative committee report articulating some state inter-
est or policy--other than frustration of the federal objective--that would be tangentially
furthered by the proposed state law." Id at 652.
Indeed, the district court in Pacific Legal Found. v. State Energy Resources Conserva-
tion & Dev. Comm'n, 472 F. Supp. 191, 198 (S.D. Cal. 1979), inferred that this type of
legislative tactic was used by the California legislature in an attempt to save its nuclear
power laws from a constitutional challenge.
Actually, the preoccupation with stated purpose is questionable, for "[i]n determining
whether a state statute effects its articulated purpose a court examines the practical effects of
the legislation rather than any statement of purpose contained in the law itself or its legisla-
tive history." Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 439 F. Supp. 420, 438 (1977) (citing Foster-
Foundation Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 10 (1928)).
42. 402 U.S. at 656.
43. Despite the overly broad rejection of purpose in Perez, the Huron holding, see note
38 and accompanying text supra, resurfaced in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151
(1978). With regard to Washington's imposition of safety design requirements on federally
licensed ships, the Court stated, "The mere fact that a vessel has been inspected and found to
comply with the Secretary's vessel safety regulations does not prevent a State or city from
enforcing local laws having other purposes." Id at 164.
44. The abandonment of the "possibility" or "danger" of conflict as a basis for preemp-
tion was forcefully stated in Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973). "We must also be
[Vol. 9:623
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Furthermore, preempted areas must be clearly identified by Con-
gress. 45 The Court is reluctant to infer preemption simply because the
subject matter itself suggests that national uniformity is desirable.46 It
is beyond the scope of this note, however, to argue the merits or demer-
its of the current preemption doctrine. Rather, this note will accept the
current doctrine and will examine the federal and California nuclear
power regulations in that light.
II. Regulation of Nuclear Power
We now turn to a discussion of the federal and state statutory
schemes at issue in Pacfc Legal Foundation in order to understand the
claims of preemption raised by PG&E.
A. Federal Regulation
Federal regulation of nuclear power began with the Atomic En-
ergy Act of 1946. 47 Although Congress was interested in the economic
aspects of the new technology, the paramount objectives of the Act
were military.48 The Act established a governmental monopoly over
the development and use of atomic energy49 as well as exclusive control
over all nuclear materials.50 It also created the Atomic Energy Coin-
careful to distinguish those situations in which the concurrent exercise of a power by the
Federal Government and the States or by the States alone maypossibly lead to conflicts and
those situations where conflicts will necessarily arise. 'It is not ... a mere possibility of
inconvenience in the exercise of powers, but an immediate constitutional repugnancy that
can by implication alienate and extinguish a pre-existing right of [state] sovereignty."' Id
at 554-55 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 243 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961))
(emphasis in original).
45. In 1965, while stating the purpose of a clarifying amendment to the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954, Congress recognized that "it is scarcely reasonable for Congress simply to leave
to the courts the resolution of a problem involving solely the determination of the intention
of Congress. It is a responsibility of Congress to assist the courts by spelling out that inten-
tion." H.R. REP. No. 567, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1965), reprintedin 1965 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2775, 2780. See note 61 and accompanying text infra.
46. In Department of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973), the Court observed,
"'If Congress is authorized to act in a field, it should manifest its intention clearly. It will
not be presumed that a federal statute was intended to supersede the exercise of power of the
state unless there is a clear manifestation of intention to do so. The exercise of federal power
is not lightly to be presumed."' Id at 413 (quoting Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 202-03
(1952)).
47. Ch. 724, 60 Stat. 755 (1946). For more historical background, see C. ALLARDICE &
E. TRAPNELL, THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (1974).
48. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, § l(a), 60 Stat 755-56 (1946).
49. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, § l(b)(4), 60 Stat. 756 (1946). Because of the weapons
aspect, Congress felt "an absolute Government monopoly.. . is indispensible." S. RPp.
No. 1211, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 14, reprinted in 1946 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1327,
1330. Section 10(b)(4) provided for the possibility of the death penalty for anyone disclosing
restricted data with intent to injure the United States, 60 Stat. 767 (1946).
50. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, § 5(a)(2), (b)(2), 60 Stat. 760-61 (1946).
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
mission (AEC) to promote and regulate the use of atomic energy.51
The Atomic Energy Act of 195452 sought to accommodate the
changes in the atomic energy field that had occurred since 1946. Con-
gress realized that it had to relax governmental control in order to en-
courage private development of atomic power. Private development of
atomic power was no longer considered a threat to national security.
5 3
The 1954 Act ended the governmental monopoly on atomic energy
resources. It allowed private industry, under license from the AEC, to
use and control various nuclear materials.14 It also allowed private in-
dustries licensed by the AEC to construct and operate production and
utilization facilities, thereby paving the way for commercial power re-
actors. Although the Act recognized the unique hazards created by
atomic energy, safety was not an important issue. 6 As in the 1946 Act,
51. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, § 2, 60 Stat. 756-58 (1946). Congress later realized that
the AEC's dual functions conflicted, and thus separated them in the Energy Reorganization
Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5891 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The 1974 Act's purpose was to
"develop, and increase the efficiency and reliability of use of, all energy sources to meet the
needs of present and future generations." 42 U.S.C. § 5801(a) (1976). No preference was
given to nuclear power. The 1974 Act abolished the AEC, 42 U.S.C. 5814(a) (1976), gave
the newly established Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) the
AEC's promotional functions, 42 U.S.C. 5814(c) (1976), and created the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) to take over its licensing and regulatory authority, 42 U.S.C. § 5842
(1976). In 1977, the Department of Energy Organization Act abolished ERDA and trans-
ferred its functions to the new Department of Energy (DOE). 42 U.S.C. §§ 7131, 7151
(Supp. III 1979).
52. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, ch. 1073, 68 Stat. 919 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2011-2296 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)).
53. S. REP. No. 1699, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-4, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CoDE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 3456, 3458-59. See generally E. ROLPH, NUCLEAR POWER AND THE PUBLIC
SAFETY (1979).
54. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, ch. 1973, §§ l1(e), Il(s), 11(t), 57, 62, 81, 68 Stat. 923,
924, 932, 935 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2014(e), 2014(z), 2014(aa), 2071, 2092,
2111 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)). The three categories of AEC regulated nuclear materials are
special nuclear, source, and byproduct. Special nuclear means plutonium and uranium en-
riched in the isotope 233 or 235. These materials are used in nuclear reactors. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2014(aa), 2071 (1976). Source material refers to uranium and thorium, the raw materials
which yield the special nuclear materials. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2014(z), 2091 (1976). Byproduct
materials are "any radioactive material (except special nuclear material) yielded in or made
radioactive by exposure to the radiation incident to the process of producing or utilizing
special nuclear material" and the tailings produced by the processing of ore to obtain source
material. 42 U.S.C. § 2014(e) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
55. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, ch. 1073, § 101, 68 Stat. 936 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. 2131 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)). A utilization facility is a facility that utilizes special
nuclear materials. Nuclear power plants are utilization facilities. 42 U.S.C. § 2014(cc)
(1976). A production facility refers to equipment that is capable of producing significant
quantities of special nuclear materials. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2014(v), 2061 (1976).
56. For example, AEC licensees had to take measures to protect the health and safety of
the public. 42 U.S.C. § 2133(b) (1976). However, "[n]o questions regarding the possible
safety hazards of nuclear technology were ever explored in the hearings and there were no
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the primary goals were defense oriented.57
Congress intended merely to control the nuclear aspect of nuclear
power.58 The amendments to the Act left traditional state functions
undisturbed. Section 271, one of the amendments, stated, "Nothing in
this chapter shall be construed to affect the authority or regulations of
any Federal, State, or local agency with respect to the generation, sale,
or transmission of electric power."5 9 Senator Hubert Humphrey em-
phasized that section 271 was a "positive negation of any intent by [the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954] to interfere with the existing laws and the
existing authorities, State and Federal, that have to do with electric-
ity."6 Ten years later, Congress again made clear that section 271 does
not confer upon the states any new authority over nuclear facilities but
merely delineates the AEC's exclusive jurisdiction.
61
discussions of what might constitute an 'acceptable' level of risk." E. ROLPH, supra note 53,
at 27-28.
57. The congressional declaration of policy stated: "The development, use, and control
of atomic energy shall be directed so as to make the maximum contribution to the general
welfare, subject at all times to the paramount objective of making the maximum contribu-
tion to the common defense and security .. " 42 U.S.C. § 2011(a) (1976).
58. Statements made during the debate over § 271 and other proposed amendments
support this interpretation.
"MR. HICKENLOOPER . . . . We take the position that electricity is electricity.
Once it is produced it should be subject to the proper regulatory bodies,. . . We feel that
there is no difference and that it should be treated as all other electricity which is regulated
by the public ....
"MR. HUMPHREY. . . . I agree. . . . The fact is it becomes electricity. . . . I see no
reason why electricity should be treated any differently because of the parentage of the gen-
eration." 100 CONG. REc. 11567 (1954), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
ATOMIC ENERGY AcT OF 1954 3760 (1955) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
59. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, ch. 1073, § 271, 68 Stat. 960 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 2018 (1976)).
60. 100 CONG. REC. 11709 (1954), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 58, at
3834. See also Cavers, Legislative Readjustments in Federal and State Regulatory Powers
Over Atomic Energ, Symposium on Atomic Energy and the Law, 46 CALIF. L. REV. 22, 26-29
(1958); Murphy & La Pierre, Nuclear "Moratorium" Legislation in the States and the
Supremacy Clause: A Case of Express Preemption, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 392, 407-08 (1976).
61. This clarification of intent was prompted by the ruling in Maun v. United States,
347 F.2d 970 (9th Cir. 1965), upholding a local ordinance based on § 271, that prohibited
overhead transmission lines of a capacity needed for an AEC licensed facility. Congress
passed an amended version of§ 271 immediately after the decision, nullifying the holding in
Maun. The new section added that "this section shall not be deemed to confer upon any
Federal, State, or local agency any authority to regulate, control, or restrict any activities of
the Commission." 42 U.S.C. § 2018 (1976).
Congress also used the opportunity to restate its intent to exclusively regulate only the
unique aspects of nuclear power. "[AEC licensees] are subject to AEC's control with respect
to the common defense and security and protection of the health and safety of the public
with respect to the special hazards associated with nuclear facilities, and otherwise to any
and all applicable Federal, State, and local regulations with respect to the generation, sale,
or transmission of electric power." H.R. REP. No. 567, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. 9-10, reprinted
in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2775, 2784.
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In 1959, Congress passed section 274, an amendment to the 1954
Act.6 2 The purpose of the new section was to recognize the interests of
the states and to clarify their responsibilities in the regulation of by-
product, source, and special nuclear materials.63 A reexamination of
these responsibilities was necessary in light of rapid developments in
the field and a corresponding increase in local regulation. 4 Section
274 sought to establish an orderly regulatory pattern between the states
and the AEC65 and to discontinue federal responsibility in areas in
which the states had the capacity to regulate.
66
The amendment authorized the AEC to enter into agreements
with states that would allow states to regulate source, byproduct, and
special nuclear materials in order to protect the public from radiation
hazards.67 The AEC nonetheless retained exclusive authority over the
construction and operation of production or utilization facilities.6 8 Sec-
62. Act of September 23, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-373, § 1, 73 Stat. 688 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(a)(1) (1976). For an explanation of these terms, see note 54supra.
64. See JOINT COMM. ON ATOMIC ENERGY, SELECTED MATERIALS ON FEDERAL-STATE
COOPERATION IN THE ATOMIC ENERGY FIELD, 86TH CONG., 1ST SESS. (1959); Symposium on
Atomic Energy and the Law, 46 CALIF. L. REV. 1, (1958). The note of the need for further
congressional delineation of state authority sounds much the same today. See, e.g.,
Parenteau, Regulation f Nuclear Power Plants: A Constitutional Dilemma/or the States, 6
ENVTL. L. 675 (1976); Note, Nuclear Power Regulation: Defining the Scope of State Author-
ity, 18 ARIZ. L. REv. 987 (1976); Comment, Federal Preemption of State Laws Controlling
Nuclear Power, 64 GEO. L.J. 1323 (1976); Note, Nuclear Power Plant Siting: Additional Re-
ductions in State Authority?, 28 U. FLA. L. REV. 439 (1976); Note, AFlication ofthe Preemp-
tion Doctrine to State Laws Affecting Nuclear Power Plants, 62 VA. L. REv. 738 (1976).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(a)(3) (1976).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(a)(4), (6) (1976).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b) (Supp. III 1979). An agreement was conditioned upon an AEC
finding that the state program was "compatible" with the commission's program for the
regulation of such hazards. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(d)(2) (Supp. III 1979). In addition, the state's
governor had to certify that the state had a "program for the control of radiation hazards
adequate to protect the public health and safety" with respect to the materials covered by the
agreement. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(d)(1) (1976).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(c)(1) (1976). The AEC also was prohibited from entering into an
agreement that would discontinue any of its responsibilities over the export and import of
such materials and facilities, and for the disposal into the sea of such materials. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2021(c)(2)-(3) (1976).
The statement that the AEC expected to discontinue more of its responsibilities when it
deemed the states capable of assuming authority together with the required assurance of
state competence, see note 67 supra, supports the view that the AEC desired to regulate only
those aspects of nuclear power that the states were technologically incapable of regulating
themselves (excluding the issues involving foreign affairs). In 1959, the AEC did not feel
that the states were able to protect the public from the hazards of nuclear reactors. "Licens-
ing and regulation of more dangerous activities-such as nuclear reactors-will remain the
exclusive responsibility of the Commission. Thus a line is drawn between types of activities
deemed appropriate for regulation by individual States at this time, and other activities
where continued AEC regulation is necessary. . . . [Tlhis is interim legislation. The com-
mittee believes that the uses of atomic energy will be so widespread in future years that
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tion 274(k) states that the 1959 amendments in no way preempted state
authority to regulate nonradiation hazards. "Nothing in this section
shall be construed to affect the authority of any State or local agency to
regulate activities for purposes other than protection against radiation
hazards."69
The comments of .the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy show
that Congress intended, although it was never expressly asserted, to
preempt state regulation of nuclear material when the AEC retained
regulatory authority:7"
It is not intended to leave any room for the exercise of dual or
-concurrent jurisdiction by States to control radiation hazards by
regulating byproduct, source, or special nuclear materials. The
intent is to have the material regulated and licensed either by the
Commission, or by the State and local governments, but not by
states should continue to prepare themselves for increased responsibilities." S. REP. No.
870, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9, reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2872, 2879-
80. Thus, the AEC's exclusive regulation in these areas was based on state capacity, or lack
thereof, to adequately regulate rather than on a desire to maintain centralized control over
the development of nuclear power.
69. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) (1976) (emphasis added). Subsection (k)'s affirmance of state
power to regulate for purposes other than radiation hazards must be reconciled with subsec-
tion (c)'s apparent declaration of AEC's exclusive and total authority for the construction
and operation of nuclear reactors. Although subsection (c), by itself, could be read as pre-
empting all state regulation of the construction and operation of nuclear plants, it is more
likely, in view of the other subsections, that subsection (c) merely meant that the AEC was
not to relinquish any of its already existing exclusive authority over this aspect of nuclear
power. According to the 1954 Act and its legislative history, this exclusive jurisdiction was
limited to the regulation of the special hazards, such as radiation, associated with nuclear
power. See notes 58-61 and accompanying text supra. Subsection (k) states that this preser-
vation of exclusivity is not to be read as expanding preemption to include state regulation of
activities for nonradiation purposes. Furthermore, because § 274 is primarily concerned
with state regulation of radiation hazards, subsection (c) should not be construed as being
concerned with matters other than radiation hazards.
70. S. REP. No. 870, supra note 68 at 8, 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 2879.
Some reasons for Congress not explicitly stating the precise areas of preemption in the
amendments are given in Murphy & La Pierre, supra note 60, at 398-405. First, the AEC felt
that preemption was "substantially implicit" in the amendment. Hearings Before the Joint
Comm on Atomic Energy on Federal-State Relationshps in the Atomic Energy Field, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. 489 (1959) [hereinafter cited as 1959 Hearings].
Second, the AEC felt that by explicitly stating the areas of preemption, it would be
forced into fixing the scope of preemption. The AEC sought to "avoid defining the precise
extent of that preemption, feeling that it is better to leave these kinds of detailed questions
perhaps up to the courts later to be resolved." 1959 Hearings, supra, at 308, quoted in United
States v. City of New York, 463 F. Supp. 604, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
Representative Durham disapproved of the AEC's intent. "I don't agree in writing an
act like that. I think it should be clearly defined and understood what is our field and what
is their Aeld... . I think the law should be as clear as possible to avoid litigation." 1959
Hearings, supra, at 308, quoted in Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143,
1156 (8th Cir. 1971) (Van Oosterhout, J., dissenting). Compare this view with Congress'
statement that it is their responsibility to spell out their intent, supra note 45.
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both.71
Specifically referring to section 274(k), the committee said:
This subsection is intended to make it clear that the bill does not
impair the State authority to regulate activities of AEC licensees
for the manifold health, safety, and economic purposes other than
radiationprotection. As indicated elsewhere, the Commission has
exclusive authority to regulate for protection against radiation
hazards until such time as the State enters into an agreement with
the Commission to assume such responsibility.72
In 1972, in Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota,7 3 the Supreme
Court affirmed a federal court of appeals ruling that the 1954 Act and
the 1959 amendments show the "federal government has exclusive au-
thority under the preemption doctrine to regulate the construction and
operation of nuclear power plants" for radiation hazards.74 In every
nuclear power preemption case since Northern States, implied preemp-
tion of state regulation of nuclear power for purposes of protection
from radiation hazards has been found.7 5 Congress has indicated that
71. S. REP. No. 870, supra note 68 at 9, reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2872, 2879.
72. Id at 12, 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2879 (emphasis added).
73. 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), affdmem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
74. 447 F.2d at 1154. Although the court's conclusion did not explicitly state that the
preemption pertaining to the construction and operation of nuclear power plants was con-
fined to regulations for radiation hazard purposes, the court's analysis indicated that this
area of preemption was indeed so limited. The court said, "The only logically acceptable
reason for inclusion of subsection (k) within 2021 was to make it clear that Congress was
not, by subsection (c) of the 1959 amendment, in any way further limiting the power of the
states to regulate activities, other than radiation hazards, associated with those areas over
which the AEC was forbidden to relinquish its control." Id at 1150 (emphasis in original).
See note 69 supra.
75. See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Fahner, No. 80 Civ. 6835 (N.D. Il. Oct. 12, 1981)
(state regulation of radioactive material preempted in the absence of a "section 274 agree-
ment" with the NRC); United States v. City of New York, 463 F. Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(state regulation and licensing of operation and construction of nuclear reactors, for radio-
logical health and safety reasons preempted). Before Northern States, the problem had not
arisen in federal court.
State court decisions include Northern Cal. Ass'n to Preserve Bodega Head & Harbor,
Inc. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 61 Cal. 2d 126, 390 P.2d 200, 37 Cal. Rptr. 432 (1964) (state
could not regulate radiological safety); Marshall v. Consumers Pow'er Co., 65 Mich. App.
237, 237 N.W.2d 266 (1975) (state could not regulate the emergency core-cooling system
because they were prohibited from regulating radioactive hazards); Public Interest Research
Group of N.J., Inc. v. State Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 152 N.J. Super. 191, 377 A.2d 915
(1977) (state has no authority to impose either higher or lower safety standards than those of
the NRC to regulate radiation hazards); State Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. Jersey Cent.
Power & Light Co., 69 N.J. 102, 351 A.2d 337 (1976) (utility could not be penalized by the
state for killing fish during a cold water discharge mandated by NRC operating regulations).
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the Northern States analysis of its intent is correct.76
Similarly, courts have repeatedly held that the states are not pre-
empted from regulating nuclear power for purposes other than protec-
tion from radiation hazards.77 The Supreme Court has said that the
states may prohibit nuclear power on economic grounds.78  The Nu-
clear Regulatory Commission (NRC), which also considers its author-
ity to be exclusive in radiologic safety matters,79 recognizes that the
states have authority in all other areas.80 Thus, the lines of preemption
have been drawn: States may regulate nuclear power only for purposes
other than protection from radiation hazards.
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 19771 subject radioactive air
pollutants to regulation under the Act. 2 Following Northern States,
radioactive air pollutants had been considered part of the radiologic
hazards associated with the operation of a nuclear power plant, thus
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the NRC. The 1977 amendments
granted to both the Environmental Protection Agency and the states
the authority to regulate radioactive air pollutants for the first time.
3
The Clean Air Act Amendments are consistent with congressional
intent to regulate exclusively only those areas that it feels the states are
76. 2 SENATE COMM. OF PUBLIC WORKS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER
POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1265-66 (1973). See
also Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1, 14-17 (1976).
77. See, e.g., Northern Cal. Ass'n to Preserve Bodega Head & Harbor, Inc. v. Public
Util. Comm'n, 61 Cal. 2d 126, 133, 200 P.2d 200, 204, 37 Cal. Rptr. 432, 436 (state can take
into account earthquake faults when zoning power plants because this involves considera-
tions apart from radiological hazards); Marshall v. Consumers Power Co., 65 Mich. App.
237, 259, 237 N.W.2d 266, 280 (1975) (AEC license is not a federal order to build a nuclear
plant; federal licensees must still conform to state common law).
78. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519, 550 (1978).
79. 10 C.F.R. § 8.4 (1981).
80. In re Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 7 N.R.C. 31 (Atomic Safety and Li-
censing App. Bd. 1978). "States retain the right, even in the face of the issuance of an NRC
construction permit, to preclude construction on such bases as a lack of need for additional
generating capacity or the environmental unacceptability of the proposed facility or site."
Id at 34.
81. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. III 1979).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 7422 (Supp. III 1979).
83. The House Report states that the amendments "would not preempt States from set-
ting and enforcing stricter air pollution standards for radiation than the Federal standards
and would not follow the holding of Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota... in the
context of radioactive air pollution" (citation omitted). H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 43 n.8, reprintedin 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1077, 1121 n.8. The report
noted that this may "necessitate extra caution in the construction, operation, and mainte-
nance of nuclear facilities... ." Id at 43, 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 1121.
Thus, a state regulation enacted for a purpose that is not preempted may encroach upon a
preempted area yet escape preemption. See notes 38-44 and accompanying text supra.
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not technically competent to manage. As the states have gained exper-
tise in nuclear power, Congress has delegated greater regulatory re-
sponsibility to them. 4 Thus, the Clean Air Act now allows the states a
special exception to their general lack of authority to regulate the con-
struction and operation of nuclear power plants for radiological health
and safety reasons. States continue to retain their authority to regulate
special nuclear byproduct and source materials for radiation hazards
and, pursuant to the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act, they may
regulate the construction and operation of nuclear power plants for
hazards from radioactive air pollutants.
B. California's Nuclear Power Regulations
The California statutes challenged by PG&E fall into two groups:
(1) the power plant siting provisions of the Warren-Alquist Act, 5 en-
acted in 1974;86 and (2) the three amendments to that Act which were
enacted in 1976.87 The Warren-Alquist Act established a "one-stop"
licensing and siting procedure for all thermal power plants."8 The 1976
amendments deal exclusively with the licensing of nuclear power
plants. It is therefore necessary to examine each group of regulations
separately.
1. The Warren-Alquist Act
Prior to the Warren-Alquist Act, a utility was required to obtain a
certificate of convenience and necessity from the California Public
Utilities Commission (CPUC) before it could construct a power plant
in California.89 It also had to obtain permits from a myriad of federal,
state, and local agencies.90 Each agency had jurisdiction over some
particular aspect of the power plant or its environment concurrently
with the CPUC. Under the Public Utilities Code, the CPUC had (and
84. See notes 67-69 and accompanying text supra.
85. See notes 5 & 8 supra.
86. This Act became effective January 7, 1975.
87. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25524.1-.3 (West 1977 & Supp. 1981).
88. A thermal power plant converts heat energy into electrical energy. Geothermal,
nuclear, oil-fired, and coal-fired power plants are examples of thermal power plants. Hydro-
electric sources of power, for example, are not.
For a description of the entire Warren-Alquist Act, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 25000-
25968 (West 1977 & Supp. 1981), see Note, California's Energy Commission: Illusions ofa
One-Stop Power Plant Siting Agency, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1313 (1977).
89. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 1001 (West 1975).
90. Nearly thirty permits from other agencies were required. STAFF REPORT TO THE
JOINT COMM. ON ENERGY POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION, ENERGY ADMINISTRATION AND
REGULATION IN CALIFORNIA: AN ANALYSIS 28 (1979).
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still has)9' the general authority to "supervise and regulate every public
utility in the State and may do all things. . . which are necessary and
convenient in the exercise of such power and jurisdiction." 92 It is em-
powered to require the utilities to furnish "reasonable service . . . as
[is] necessary to promote the safety, health, comfort, and convenience
of its patrons, employees, and the public."93
This procedure came under criticism in the early 1970's94 when
both long and short range energy problems became apparent. Under
this regulatory scheme, there was neither long range planning for land
use or energy demand nor public participation in the planning process.
Extensive duplication and conflict among the various agencies was the
norm. Furthermore, review of a utility's plans generally came only af-
ter substantial utility commitment, by which time the utility was pri-
marily interested in protecting its investment."
Faced with these problems, the legislature held hearings96 and
commissioned several studies97 to recommend better siting procedures.
The legislature identified four essential functions of a proposed new
energy agency:9" (1) forecasting of and planning for energy demand;
(2) research and development of energy sources; (3) conservation en-
91. A certificate of convenience and necessity may not be issued, however, unless the
Energy Commission created by the Warren-Alquist Act, see note 100 and accompanying
text infra, approves the proposed facility beforehand. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25518 (West
1977).
92. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 701 (West 1975).
93. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 451 (West 1975 & Supp. 1981). The CPUC also has the
power to require that the "rules, practices, equipment, appliances, facilities, or service of any
public utility, or the methods of manufacture, distribution, transmission, storage, or supply
employed by it" are operated in a reasonable, efficient, and safe manner. Id at 761. The
CPUC may order that "additions, extensions, repairs, or improvements to, or changes in, the
existing plant, equipment, apparatus, facilities, or other physical property of any public util-
ity.... [be made] to promote the security or convenience of its employees or the public."
Id at 762.
Furthermore, the commission may "require every public utility to construct, maintain,
and operate its line, plant, system, equipment,. . . and premises in such manner as to pro-
mote and safeguard the health and safety of its employees, passengers, customers, and the
public." Id at 768.
94. See, e.g., STAFF REPORT TO THE JOINT COMM. ON ENERGY POLICY & IMPLEMENTA-
TION, supra note 90, at 28.
95. See Subcomi. on State Energy Policy fthe Assembly Comm on Planning and Land
Use, Hearings on State Energy Policy, Part V Power Plant Siting (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings o Power Plant Siting].
96. .d
97. THE RAND CORPORATION, CALIFORNIA'S ELECTRICITY QUANDARY (1972), CALI-
FORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY LABORATORY, STATE
POWER SITING: A SKETCH OF THE MAIN FEATURES OF A POSSIBLE APPROACH (1973). See
also STANFORD RESEARCH INSTITUTE, MEETING CALIFORNIA'S ENERGY REQUIREMENTS,
1975-2000 (1973) (commissioned by the utilities).
98. The utilities and the state agreed that a central authority was a necessary feature of
an efficient and effective system, Hearings on Power Plant Siting, supra note 95, at 67, 195.
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couragement; and (4) an improved power plant siting process. 99 The
Warren-Alquist Act subsequently created the Energy Resources Con-
servation and Development Commission (Energy Commission) with
authority over these four concerns. °°
To streamline the siting process, the legislature gave the Energy
Commission "the exclusive power to certify all sites" and declared that
a certificate from the Commission shall be "in lieu of any permit, certif-
icate, or similar document required by any state, local or regional
agency, or federal agency to the extent permitted by federal law." '
Under the siting procedures established by the Act, any utility that
proposes to build a thermal power plant must file a notice of intention
(NOI) to apply for an application for certification. 2 The NOI is used
to determine the suitability of the proposed site.10 3 It must state the
location of the site, the proposed design of the new facility, the methods
of construction and operation, and the type of fuel to be used." 4 In
addition, it must identify at least three alternative sites'05 (at least two
of which must be acceptable for the NOI to be approved),0 6 along with
the relative economic, technological, and environmental advantages
and disadvantages of each site.'
0 7
The Commission holds public informational and nonadjudicatory
hearings on the NOI,'0 8 identifies issues to be considered in later stages
of the siting process, and determines those which can be immediately
eliminated from further consideration." 9 The Commission then holds
adjudicatory hearings" ° and examines the appropriateness of the
99. Hearings on Power Plant Siting, supra note 95, at 7.
100. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 25200-25224 (West 1977 & Supp. 1981). Sections 25300-
25323 provided for electrical energy demand planning and forecasting, §§ 25400-25486 for
energy resources conservation, §§ 25500-25542 for power plant siting, §§ 25600-25615 for
research and development, §§ 25700-25705 for energy shortage contingency planning, and
§§ 25800-25804 established a conservation and development account.
101. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 25500 (West 1977).
102. Id at § 25502.
103. Id
104. Id at § 25504.
105. Id at § 25503 (West 1977 & Supp. 1981).
106. Id at § 25516.
107. Id at § 25504 (West 1977).
108. Id at § 25509 (West 1977 & Supp. 1981). Open planning, that is, early public par-
ticipation in the siting process, had been emphasized during the hearings on the Warren-
Alquist Act in order to eliminate the adversarial nature of the then-existing siting procedures
and to insure the environmental acceptability of a proposed site. See Statement of James
Krier, Hearings on Power Plant Siting, supra note 95, at 16. The utilities supported the open
planning proposal. Subcomm. on State Energy Policy of the Assembly Comm. on Planning
and Land Use, Hearings on State Energy Policy, Part V: Review of AEC Nuclear Safety
Criteria 198 (1973).
109. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25512 (West 1977 & Supp. 1981).
110. Id at §25513.
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site."1' Before issuing its final report, the Commission must review the
safety and reliability of the proposed plant and must require detailed
information from the utility on the proposed emergency systems and
safety precautions, the plans for handling and storing wastes and fuels,
and the special seismic features of the plant.'" 2 For nuclear plants, in-
formation is required on proposed methods to prevent illegal diversion
of nuclear fuels and to control density of population in the area sur-
rounding the facility." 3 The Commission then decides whether or not
to approve the NOI.114
If approved, the utility must file an application for certification
(AFC)." 5 The AFC must contain the information on safety and relia-
bility given in the NOI in greater detail.Y6 The Commission holds
public hearings on the AFC 1 7 and must issue a written decision on the
AFC within eighteen months after it is filed."
8
2. Nuclear Power
The 1976 amendments to the Warren-Alquist Act deal with three
specific technical aspects of nuclear power. To understand these provi-
sions and the reasons for their enactment, it is necessary to examine
briefly how nuclear power is produced." 9 Resolution of the preemp-
tion issues in Pac'ft Legal Foundation is dependent on careful consid-
eration of the scientific controversy. This is evidenced by the fact that
the legal and political controversy has arisen because of scientific and
technological uncertainty.
Ill. Id at §25511.
112. Id
113. Id
114. Id at §25516.
115. Id at §25519.
116. Id at § 25520 (West 1977). The information required includes a description of the
design, construction and operation of the proposed facility, available site information (geo-
logic, seismic, ecological, aesthetic, water supply and population data), a statement of need
for the facility, the type and cost of fuel to be used, the cost of the plant, and the cost of the
operation.
117. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE § 25521 (West 1977).
118. Id at § 25522.
119. Other articles that present the technological side of the controversy are Tribe, Cali-
fornia Declines The Nuclear Gamble: Is Such a State Choice Preempted?, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q.
679 (1979); Comment, Slaying the Nuclear Giants: Is California's New Nuclear Power Plant
Siting Legislation Shielded.4gainst the Attack of Federal Preemption?, 8 PAC. L.J. 741 (1977);
Note, California's Nuclear Power Plant Siting Legislation: 4 Preemption Analysis, 52 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1189 (1979).
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a. Reactor Operation
Nuclear reactors operate on the principle of fission. 20  In fission,
a heavy element such as uranium (U) or plutonium (Pu) absorbs a neu-
tron and splits into two lighter elements, releasing two or three more
neutrons and a large amount of energy.' 2 ' A chain reaction develops
when at least one of the released neutrons initiates another fission. In
commercial power reactors, the speed of the reaction is controlled so
that a constant stream of energy is produced.
122
Part of the released energy is in the form of heat. The heat is used
to change water into steam, and the steam turns the generating turbines
that produce electricity. The water also serves to cool the reactor, 123 for
the heat is so intense that without adequate cooling the fuel would melt
its containers and then melt through the floor of the reactor building.
If the superheated fuel came into contact with water in the ground, a
steam explosion could result, releasing deadly clouds of radioactive gas
into the atmosphere.
Because of this danger, measures are taken to insure that the reac-
tor is constantly cooled. All reactors have an emergency core-cooling
system to operate in case of a loss-of-coolant accident. No emergency
core-cooling system, however, has been tested in full-scale operation.
The potential safety threat to nearby populations in case of a loss-of-
coolant accident is a major source of debate between supporters and
120. NUCLEAR ENERGY POLICY STUDY GROUP, NUCLEAR POWER ISSUES AND CHOICES
389-405 (1977) [hereinafter cited as ISSUES AND CHOICES]. See generaly J. HOGERTON,
ATOMIC FUEL (1964); R. LYERLY & W. MITCHELL, NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS (1973).
121. Materials which can fission on the absorbtion of a neutron are called fissile. U-235,
Pu-239, and U-233 are all fissile. Natural uranium is 0.7% U-235, with the rest being U-238.
Reactor fuel must be at least 3% U-235 (uranium for nuclear weapons must be at least 90%
U-235). Thus, natural uranium must be "enriched" before it is used in a reactor or weapon.
On absorbtion of a fast neutron, U-238 becomes Pu-239. The plutonium produced
from this absorption, if separated from the other fission products, can be used as new fuel. A
reactor thus has the potential to produce more fuel than it consumes. Such reactors, called
breeders (normal reactors, which use more fuel than they produce, are called converters and
use slow neutrons because they are more likely to cause a fission), possess an obvious advan-
tage in fuel supply, but the plutonium used and produced in breeders can also be used in
weapons. Because of the alleged proliferation problems, President Carter deferred the date
when the breeder will be put to commercial use. Nuclear Power Poliy, 13 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 502, 503 (April 7, 1977). Although President Reagan has decided to proceed
with the development of breeder technology, breeders are still not expected to come into
service for 20 to 30 years. N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1981, at 1, col. 1.
122. In a nuclear bomb, the speed at which the chain reaction progresses is uncontrolled.
There are not enough neutrons released in a commercial reactor to produce a nuclear
explosion.
123. Three-fourths of the reactors in the United States are cooled by ordinary, or light,
water, hence the name light-water reactor. Heavy water (D20), gas, and liquid metals (such
as sodium) are also used to cool reactors. ISSUES AND CHOICES, supra note 120, at 392.
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opponents of nuclear power."'
b. Reprocessing
Spent fuel must be removed from the reactor when only one or
two percent of the fuel atoms have been used because of the physical
distortion of fuel rods and the absorption of neutrons by the fission
products. 125 Recovering the unused fuel by a method known as
reprocessing would reduce uranium needs by twenty-two percent and
enrichment requirements by fourteen percent.
126
Until recently, it was generally assumed that spent fuel would be
reprocessed. To date, however, spent fuel has been stored at reactor
facilities, and still waits there to be shipped off for reprocessing.
Reprocessing has never become commercially feasible. Skyrocketing
costs have cast doubt on the economic advantages of reprocessing, 127
and none of the three reprocessing plants that have been built in the
United States has ever operated as planned. 128 There have been no
124. Much of the controversy has centered around the NRC's Reactor Safety Study, also
known as the Rasmussen Report. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N, REACTOR SAFETY
STUDY: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCIDENT RISKS IN U.S. COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER
PLANTS-MAIN REPORT (WASH-1400) (NUREG-75/014) (1975). The Rasmussen Re-
port studied the emergency core-cooling system and calculated the probabilities of various
accidents. For the most serious accident, which the report estimated had a probability of
one in two hundred million years of reactor operation, the consequences would be three or
four thousand deaths within a few weeks, tens of thousands of deaths over thirty years, a
comparable number of genetic defects over successive generations, and around $14 billion in
property damage. The report concluded that the average rate of loss for a 1,000 MWe nu-
clear power plant would be about 0.02 fatalities per year, compared with two to twenty-five
fatalities per year estimated for a coal plant of the same capacity.
The Rasmussen Report's methodology for estimating the reliability of the ECCS and
the number of possible deaths has been severely criticized. It is alleged that the report does
not represent the true risks of nuclear power. The pronuclear, yet cautious, Ford Founda-
tion study concluded that the Rasmussen estimates are too low. ISSUES AND CHOICES, SUpra
note 120, at 240-41. The California legislature, in its hearings on Proposition 15, see notes
154-73 and accompanying text infra, noted the doubts about the report's accuracy. CALI-
FORNIA STATE ASSEMBLY COMM. ON RESOURCES, LAND USE, AND ENERGY, REASSESS-
MENT OF NUCLEAR ENERGY IN CALIFORNIA, A POLICY ANALYSIS OF PROPOSITION 15 AND
IrS ALTERNATrVES 42-50 (1976) [hereinafter cited as REASSESSMENT]. On January 19, 1979,
the NRC withdrew its support for the Rasmussen Report. 9 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1768 (1979).
125. J. HOGERTON, supra note 120, at 19. Not all of the spent fuel is removed at once.
Each LWR is shut down annually for a period of three weeks when about one-third of the
fuel elements are replaced. ISSUES AND CHOICES, supra note 120, at 401.
126. ISSUES AND CHOICES, supra note 120, at 319.
127. Initial reprocessing costs were $30 per kilogram of fuel, REASSESSMENT, supra note
124, at 25, while 1977 estimates reached the $200-$400 per kilogram range. ISSUES AND
CHOICES, supra note 120, at 325.
128. The Nuclear Fuel Services plant in West Valley, New York, cost $30 million to
build and reprocessed only 630 metric tons of fuel. The West Valley plant shut down be-
cause it was close to exceeding the limits on personnel exposure to radiation. Six hundred
thousand gallons of high-level waste are left sitting in the plant. President Carter signed a
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reprocessing plants in operation in the United States since 1972.129
Thus, spent fuel continues to fill up storage pools at reactors. At-
reactor spent-fuel storage pools now in existence were designed to hold
spent fuel only temporarily until reprocessing-not to store all the
spent fuel produced over a reactor's lifetime. 130 Despite claims that the
technology exists to store spent fuel temporarily at sites away from a
reactor "without endangering the public's health and safety,"' 131 there
are currently no such facilities. 132 Furthermore, utilities have been un-
willing to try to dispose of their spent fuel permanently until the fate of
reprocessing is certain. 133 Given the backlog of spent fuel and the lack
of alternatives to storage at-reactor, several reactors will close down
bill that requires the DOE to develop a plan to clean up these wastes. 11 ENV'T REP. (BNA)
798 (1980). The Department of Energy estimates the total clean-up cost to be about $1.1
billion. Ninety percent would be paid by the federal government and the rest by the State of
New York. I1 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 284 (1980).
General Electric Company built a regional reprocessing plant in Morris, Illinois, which
also was never operated as planned. It was closed in 1974, after an investment of $64 mil-
lion. ISSUES AND CHOICES, supra note 120, at 321-22.
Allied General Nuclear Services' plant, in Barnwell, South Carolina, was to reprocess
1500 tons per year by 1975. Undeveloped waste disposal technology and uncertain econom-
ics (the projected cost increased by a factor of ten over the original estimate of $70 million)
stopped development. Id at 322.
129. The only reprocessing plant in the world operating on a commercial scale is located
in La Hague, France. Id. at 322.
130. At reactor storage pools typically have a capacity of 1 to l1. cores. Ten to thirteen
cores are discharged over a plant's useful lifetime. NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE COMM., CALI-
FORNIA ENERGY RESOURCES CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT COMM'N, STATUS OF Nu-
CLEAR FUEL REPROCESSING, SPENT FUEL STORAGE, AND HIGH-LEVEL WASTE DISPOSAL,
DRAFT REPORT 99 (1978) [hereinafter cited as NFCC DRAFT REPORT]. Long term at-reac-
tor storage is also an area of technological uncertainty. Given that nuclear power is a rela-
tively new energy source, there has been no experience with at-reactor storage for periods of
20-50 years. Id at 104.
131. IRG REPORT, supra note 7, at 67.
132. See note 134 infra.
133. To encourage the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons (reprocessed plutonium can
be used in weapons), President Carter deferred "indefinitely the commercial reprocessing
and recycling of plutonium produced in U.S. nuclear power programs." Nuclear Power
Policy, 13 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 502 (April 7, 1977). President Reagan, however,
intends to lift President Carter's ban and to proceed with reprocessing. Legislation will be
necessary to implement this policy. N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1981, § 1, at 1, col. 1. The NRC
blames the uncertainty about reprocessing for the fact that utilities are not constructing away
from a reactor storage themselves. 10 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 556 (1979).
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unless more storage space is found.
134
c. Permanent Waste Disposal
Spent fuel also poses a permanent disposal problem.1 35 A nuclear
reactor produces about thirty metric tons of spent fuel per year.
36
Each ton contains about thirty kilograms of fission products, which
give off intense heat and radiation as they decay. 137 The radioactivity
decreases by a factor of 1000 over the first ten years, but it takes one
thousand more years for the radioactivity to decrease by another factor
of 1000.138 For permanent disposal, these wastes (called high-level
wastes) must be isolated in a stable environment for time spans on the
order of a quarter of a million years.'
39
There are currently no proven ways of isolating wastes in a stable
environment. While several methods are being investigated,14 0 none of
134. The accumulation of spent fuel threatens reactor operation in two ways. First, there
is a loss of full-core discharge capacity (FCDC). Full-core discharges are necessary for cer-
tain NRC inspections and loss of FCDC magnifies the risks in case of an accident.
Second, there is a loss of reload discharge capability (RDC). This means there is insuf-
ficient storage space for the spent fuel, making its removal from the core impossible. NFCC
DRAFT REPORT, supra note 130, at 100.
The NRC says more storage space is needed by 1983 to prevent shutdowns. 10 ENV'T
REP. (BNA) 556 (1979). The DOE estimates that 4,000 tons of storage space will be needed
by 1988. Id In 1976, when California considered the problem, 1000 tons of spent fuel were*
backed up in the fuel cycle. REASSESSMENT, supra note 124, at 23. According to one person
in the industry, a shutdown induced by the lack of spent fuel storage space "does not repre-
sent a serious safety problem but it does represent an economic embarrassment of the high-
est sort." 7 The Nuclear Initiative: Hearings on Prop. 15 Before the California State Assembly
Comin on Resources, Land Use, and Energy pt. 1, 177 (1975) (statement of A.E. Schubert,
President, AGNS, Barnwell, S.C.) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Prop. 15].
135. See, e.g., Cohen, The Disposal of Radioactive Wastefrom Fission Reactors, 236 Sci.
AM. 21 (June 1977).
136. ISSUES AND CHOICES, supra note 120, at 246. See generally C. Fox, RADIOACTIVE
WASTES (1969).
137. Each ton also contains a little less than ten kilograms of transuranic elements, and
the rest is unburned uranium containing approximately 0.8% U-235. The transuranic wastes
have long half-lives. Pu-239, for example, has a half-life of over 24,000 years. Pu-239 is
extremely toxic and creates cancer risks if quantities as small as one ten-millionth of a gram
are inhaled. Pu-238, which is 2.5% of the plutonium in spent uranium fuel, has a half-life of
86 years, but is several hundred times as radioactive as Pu-239. The adverse biological
effects of the radioactive fission products such as iodine-129, strontium-90, cesium-137, and
technetium-99 are well documented. See ISSUES AND CHOICES, supra note 120, at 246-47.
138. REASSESSMENT, supra note 124, at 68.
139. Finding a stable and isolated depository in the earth is difficult, for "the action of
deliberate emplacement disrupts qualities one desires from geologic disposal-absence of a
route to the surface and relative inertness." NFCC DRAFT REPORT, supra note 130, at 117.
140. The lack of development of an effective and safe permanent waste disposal method
can be attributed to the existence of temporary storage and to the failure to assign direct
responsibility for waste disposal. Industry and the federal government have each tried to
place the responsibility on the other. Recently, however, Congress has begun to budget
more money for research on this issue. A total of $206 million had been budgeted for waste
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these methods is likely to achieve full-scale operation for at least
another fifteen to thirty years. 141 Critics doubt that a safe permanent
disposal method can ever be found.
142
The experience with waste disposal has been disappointing. Both
sites chosen by the government as permanent repositories were later
rejected,1 43 and no new site is to be chosen until 1985. 44 High-level
waste disposal sites used by the military have been plagued by danger-
ous leaks. 145 Despite this track record, the federal government, utili-
ties, and many scientists still insist that the permanent waste disposal
problem will be solved within a few years.
14 6
Even without a permanent waste disposal technology, the NRC
continues to license new power plants. 47 The NRC says that it "would
not continue to license reactors if it did not have reasonable confidence
that the wastes can and will in due course be disposed of safely."
' 148
disposal research until 1967. The 1974 budget was $61 million, and the 1977 budget was
$230 million. IRG REPORT, supra note 7, at 2-5.
141. Assembly Comm.: Staff Background Papers, supra note 1, at § 3. The candidate
technologies are placement in mined repositories, in deep ocean sediments, in very deep drill
holes, in mined cavities in a manner that leads to rock melting (hence sealing of the cavity),
and ejection into space. IRG REPORT, supra note 7, at 35. The report says that, most opti-
mistically, mined repositories could be available perhaps in 10 to 15 years. Relying on this
report, President Carter announced that 11 sites of different geologic media were to be stud-
ied for permanent disposal, with one to be selected by 1985 and in operation by the mid-
1990's. Radioactive Waste Management Program, 16 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 296 (Feb.
16, 1980).
142. R.EASSESSMENr, supra note 124, at 69. The consequences of the failure to find a
permanent disposal method cannot be ignored. For example, "If there is even a small risk
that large quantities of radiotoxic waste might some day find their way into the human
environment with consequences which threaten the future of civilization, most would ques-
tion the right of contemporary society to create this hazard." IssuEs AND CHOICES, supra
note 120, at 254-55.
143. The first site, a salt mine at Lyons, Kansas, was found to be like "Swiss cheese"
because of the oil wells drilled into it. See Assembly Comm.: Staff Background Papers,
supra note 1, § 3, at 13; T. Connolly, Nuclear Technology, in STANFORD UNIV. INST. FOR
ENERGY STUDIES, THE CALIFORNIA NUCLEAR INITIATIVE 85-88 (1976).
The second site, at Carlsbad, New Mexico, was abandoned when President Carter an-
nounced his new waste disposal policy. Radioactive Waste Management Program, supra
note 141, at 295.
144. See Radioactive Waste Management Program, supra note 141, at 296.
145. As of mid-1974, 81 million gallons of liquid and solidified waste were distributed
among the following sites: Idaho Falls, Idaho (3%); the Savannah River plant, South Caro-
lina (25%); and the Hanford Reservation, in Richland, Washington (72%). ISSUES AND
CHOICES, supra note 120, at 250-51. From 1958 to 1974, 429,000 gallons leaked from the
Richland facility; in 1973 alone, 115,000 gallons leaked from the reservation for 48 days
without notice. There has been a 100 gallon leak at Savannah River. Id at 250.
146. See, e.g., 10 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1018 (1979); INSTITUTE FOR CONTEMPORARY STUD-
IES, OPTIONS FOR U.S. ENERGY POLICY 136 (1977).
147. 42 Fed. Reg. 34,391 (1977) (petition to refrain from licensing until permanent waste
disposal technology exists denied).
148. Id at 34,393.
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The NRC also believes that "[r]easonable progress towards the devel-
opment of permanent disposal facilities is presently being accom-
plished."' 49 Its authority to continue licensing has been upheld by the
courts,150 despite the lack of any actual permanent repository and in
spite of estimates that a full-scale waste disposal site will not be in oper-
ation until the mid-1990's at the earliest.'5
3. 1976 Amendments to the Warren-Alquist Act
By 1976, critics were demanding curtailment of nuclear power un-
til the risks of the emergency core-cooling system (ECCS), high-level
waste, plutonium proliferation, and rising costs were eliminated or re-
duced to a known minimum level. Proposition 15, a California voter
initiative that appeared on the June 1976 ballot, was one of the first
statutory attempts to halt the use of nuclear power. 152 It sought to pro-
hibit the licensing of additional nuclear power plants and to require the
derating of existing plants unless: (1) the effectiveness of safety sys-
tems, including the ECCS, was demonstrated to be adequate; (2) the
radioactive wastes could be stored or disposed of with no reasonable
chance of escape; and (3) the limits on liability for a reactor accident
149. Id at 34,391.
150. In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 582 F.2d 166 (2nd Cir. 1978), the court upheld the NRC's refusal to halt licensing
until the waste disposal safety issue was resolved. The court observed, "[I]t is clear that from
the very beginnings of commercial nuclear power the Congress was aware of the absence of
a permanent waste disposal facility, but decided to proceed with power plant licensing." Id
at 170. See also Illinois v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 591 F.2d 12 (7th Cir.
1979).
In Minnesota v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 602 F.2d 412 (D.C. Cir.
1979), the court allowed the NRC to "consider the complex issue of nuclear waste disposal
in a 'generic' proceeding such as rulemaking, and then apply its determination in subsequent
adjudicatory proceedings." Id at 416.
The NRC, as a rule, will continue to license reactors despite the unavailability of per-
manent disposal, 44 Fed. Reg. 45,363 (1979), and "the issues being considered in the
rulemaking should not be addressed in individual licensing proceedings." 44 Fed. Reg.
61,372 (1979).
151. See note 141 supra.
152. Proposition 15, The Land Use and Nuclear Power Liability and Safeguards Act,
would have added Title 7.8 to the California Government Code (commencing with § 67500).
The statement of purpose in proposed § 67502 included the following: "The people (and the
State of California) further find and declare that substantial questions have been raised con-
cerning the effect of nuclear fission power plants on land use and land use planning, as well
as on public health and safety. Such questions include, but are not limited to, (a) the relia-
bility of the performance of such plants, with serious economic, security, health, and safety
consequences; (b) the reliability of the emergency safety systems for such plants;. . . and
(e) the creation by one generation of potentially catastrophic hazards for future generations
.... " MARCH FONG EU, SECRETARY OF STATE, CALIFORNIA VOTERS PAMPHLET, June 8,
1976 Primary Election, at 61.
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imposed by the federal government were removed. 15 3 If passed, Propo-
sition 15 would have required all operating nuclear power plants in
California to shut down. In addition, it would have thwarted plans for
building thirty-one new, large nuclear power plants by 1994.'1 4 The
state legislature responded to Proposition 15 by holding hearings to ex-
amine the problems of nuclear power and the impact of the initiative
on the state.1
55
Through these hearings, the legislature studied the risks of the nu-
clear industry and identified four problems that even those in the in-
dustry agreed needed to be solved.1 56 These problems were classified
into four generic categories: (-1) radiologic safety, defined as "the po-
tential for massive releases of radioactive materials both from the reac-
tor and from spent fuel transportation"; (2) long-term disposal of
nuclear wastes; (3) blockages and shortages in the nuclear fuel cycle;
and (4) the economic viability of nuclear power. 157 The first two cate-
gories concern the radiation hazards associated with nuclear power,
and the last two focus on the economics of nuclear power.
In considering ways to meet these concerns while assuring Califor-
nia an adequate energy supply, the legislature sought to find some sort
of "reassessment mechanism" whereby California would use nuclear
power only if it were somehow determined to be safe and economi-
cal.'15 Some considered Proposition 15, which would have phased out
nuclear power in California unless the safety and waste disposal
problems were solved, to be too drastic. 5 9 Those opposed to Proposi-
tion 15 as a reassessment mechanism noted that ten percent of Califor-
nia's electrical generating capacity would be lost if the initiative passed.
This would have resulted in an increase in electricity rates, 60 the neces-
sity of finding replacement energy sources,161 a potentially adverse ef-
fect on employment and economic growth, 62 and a possibly even
greater environmental degradation because of the increased burning of
153. The Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e) (1976), puts a ceiling of $560 million
on the liability of a reactor operator or manufacturer in case of an accident. For a discus-
sion of the. Act's constitutionality, see Note, The Price-Anderson J.t: A Constitutional
Meltdown of Tort Liability, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 371 (1981).
154. Assembly Comm: Staff Background Papers, supra note I, at §§ 1-2.
155. See Hearings on Prop. 15, supra note 134. TheAssembly Comm.: Staff Background
Papers, supra note 1, were prepared to aid the legislators during these hearings. After the
hearings, the committee staff summarized the Hearings on Prop. 15 and Staff Background
Papers in the REASSESSMENT, supra note 124.
156. REASSESSMENT, supra note 124, at 12.
157. Id at 13.
158. Id at 103.
159. Id at 152.
160. Id at 136.
161. Id. at 142.
162. Id at 145.
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fossil fuels.'63
Furthermore, there was the possibility that Proposition 15 was pre-
empted by federal law, since it regulated the construction and opera-
tion of a nuclear power plant for radiologic hazards.'64  The
constitutionality of a state requiring full accident liability when the fed-
eral government had removed such a limitation was also a question. 165
In addition, it was not certain that California had the constitutional
power simply to shut down a private utility's power plant.'6 6 Finally,
consumers would have been required to pay hundreds of millions of
dollars in capital costs for idle plants.'67
The legislature did not dispute the motivation for the conditions in
the initiative, but only the severe consequences that followed if condi-
tions were not met. As alternatives to Proposition 15, it considered two
other methods of making a reassessment: (1) action by the Energy
Commission; 168 and (2) the passage of new legislation, similar in pur-
pose but milder in effect than Proposition 15.169 It was proposed that
the Energy Commission be authorized to conduct a review of the safety
systems and waste disposal methods on a case-by-case basis during the
licensing procedure. The legislature bypassed this approach, however,
after noting that "three of the five commissioners have expressed
pronuclear positions in public."' 17 0 It therefore pursued the second
method.
Based on the hearings concerning Proposition 15, the Assembly
Committee on Resources, Land Use and Energy introduced four pieces
of legislation, Assembly Bills 2820 through 2823, "designed to achieve
in part and to supplement the goals of the Initiative."' 7 The bills were
designed to meet the safety and economic concerns voiced throughout
the hearings, while avoiding some of the harsh effects of Proposition
15.172 Existing plants, as well as four plants already proposed, were
unaffected. In an attempt to avoid preemption, it was remarked in the
legislative history that "reactor safety per se is not addressed by the
bills" and that "[w]aste disposal safety is not directly addressed by the
bills, which ask only that a method be chosen and accepted by the fed-
eral government."' 73 Assembly Bill 2823, which would have prohibited
163. Id at 146.
164. Id at 124.
165. Id at 134.
166. Id at 135.
167. Id at 136.
168. Id at 152.
169. Id at 154.
170. Id
171. Id
172. Id at 156.
173. Id (emphasis in original). But see text accompanying note 206 infra.
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the licensing of more reactors unless the federal liability limits were
removed, was defeated in the Assembly. 74 The other bills designed to
regulate the nuclear fuel cycle and the location of nuclear power plants
were passed as amendments to the Warren-Alquist Act and are codified
in the California Public Resources Code. I75 Section 25524.1(a) prohib-
its the construction of any new nuclear power plants that require
reprocessing for operation unless there exists a federally approved
reprocessing technology. Section 25524.1(b) ftirther requires that the
Energy Commission find that either reprocessing or storage facilities
for spent fuel will be in operation by the time such reprocessing or
storage is required. Section 25524.2 prohibits the certification of any
new nuclear power plants unless there exists a federally approved waste
disposal technology. Section 25524.3 prohibits the certification of new
plants until the Energy Commission has studied the possibility of siting
new plants underground. Governor Brown signed these amendments
into law five days before the vote on the initiative."7 6 Proposition 15
was defeated by a two-to-one margin.
174. REASSESSMENT, supra note 124, at 154.
175. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 25524.1-.3 (West 1977 & Supp. 1981). Section 25524.1(a)
provides that "[n]o nuclear fission thermal powerplant requiring the reprocessing of fuel
rods" can be certified by the Energy Commission unless "[t]he commission finds that the
United States through its authorized agency has identified and approved, and there exists a
technology for the construction and operation of nuclear fuel rod reprocessing plants."
Section 25524.1(b) requires the commission to find "that facilities with adequate capac-
ity to reprocess nuclear fuel rods from a certified nuclear facility or to store such fuel if such
storage is approved by an authorized agency of the United States are in actual operation or
will be in operation at the time such nuclear facility requires such reprocessing or storage;
provided, however, that such storage of fuel is an offsite location to the extent necessary to
provide continuous onsite full core reserve storage capacity."
Section 25524.2 provides that the commission may not certify any nuclear power plant
until "the Commission finds that there has been developed and that the United States
through its authorized agency has approved and there exists a demonstrated technology or
means for the disposal of high-level nuclear waste."
Section 25524.3 prohibits the certification of any new facility until "[t]he commission
has undertaken and completed a study of the necessity for, and effectiveness and economic
feasibility of, undergrounding and berm containment of nuclear reactors, and. . . has deter-
mined whether to require by rules and regulations that nuclear reactors be either under-
grounded or berm contained."
Undergrounding is the building of the plant or reactor in deep rock, carved out by
conventional mining techniques. Berm containment is placing a reactor in an excavated pit
and then covering it with soil. See generally ENERGY FACILITY SITING DIVISION, CALIFOR-
NIA ENERGY RESOURCES CONSERVATION AND DEV. COMM'N, UNDERGROUND SITING OF
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS: A DISCUSSION OF RELEVANT ISSUES (1976).
176. Acts of June 3, 1976, ch. 194-96, 1976 Cal. Stat. 374 (codified as amended at CAL.
PUB. RES. CODE § 25524.1 to .3 (West 1977 & Supp. 1981)).
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III. Pacific LegalFoundation and the Preemption of
California's Nuclear Power Laws
Whether or not states should be able to prohibit nuclear power for
safety reasons has been hotly debated.177 In Pacfc LegalFoundation v.
State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Commission,178
the Ninth Circuit, through use of the ripeness doctrine, chose to avoid
discussing these controversial issues. In deciding whether or not a stat-
ute was ripe for review, the court evaluated "both the fitness of the
issues for judicial decisions and the hardship to the parties of withhold-
ing court consideration."' 17 9 It explained that while a challenge to a
statute or regulation is fit for judicial determination if it raises a purely
legal issue, a challenge that raises an issue which would be better illu-
minated by the development of a factual record is not ripe for re-
view.'8 0 Of the fourteen sections of the Warren-Alquist Act and the
three 1976 amendments challenged by the utilities, the court held that
only section 25503, the three-site requirement, and section 25524.2, the
waste disposal provision, were ripe for judicial review. It reasoned that
section 25503 was ripe for review because its operation was "in no way
hypothetical or speculative" and because it was inevitable that the stat-
ute would operate against certain individuals (i.e., every utility wishing
to submit a notice of intention) even though the disputed provision had
not yet been applied.' 8' The court felt that it would work a substantial
hardship on utilities to delay review of section 25524.2 until the ques-
tion of its constitutionality arose in a particular certification proceed-
ing, by which time the utility may have expended considerable
resources in the proposed plant. Because section 25524.2 inevitably
bans certification of any new nuclear power plant as long as there is no
waste disposal technology, the court felt that it was appropriate to let
the utilities know before they made plans for a new nuclear power
plant whether or not this ban was constitutional.18 2
In holding that section 25524.1(b), the requirement of functioning
storage or reprocessing facilities before licensing of future nuclear
power plants, was not ripe for review, the court observed that the En-
ergy Commission never adopted its own proposed recommendation
that section 25524.1(b) be interpreted as to require spent fuel storage
capacity over the lifetime of the reactor. From this observation, the
court reasoned that "we cannot know whether the Energy Commission
will ever find a nuclear plant's storage capacity to be inadequate," and
177. See notes 64 & 119 supra.
178. 659 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1981).
179. Id at 915 (quoting Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 139, 149 (1967)).
180. Id. at 915.
181. Id at 917.
182. Id at 918.
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held "that the challenge to section 25524.1(b) is not ripe for review."'
83
An examination of section 25524.1(b) reveals the fallacy of this
conclusion.
Section 25524.1(b) can be interpreted in several ways. One inter-
pretation is to require that spent-fuel storage space be available over
the lifetime of the reactor. As the court noted, this interpretation was
suggested in the NFCC Draft Report but was never actually adopted by
the Commission.' 84 The phrase in section 25524.1(b)--"provided,
however, that such storage of fuel is in an offsite location to the extent
necessary to provide continuous onsite full core reserve capacity"-al-
lows for another interpretation. This proviso could be interpreted as
requiring that an operating reactor always have full core discharge ca-
pacity. 85 This would be an alternate way of insuring that there would
always be sufficient space for the spent fuel produced by the reactor.
Hence, under any interpretation of section 25524.1(b), a plant's
storage capacity will be found inadequate if the fuel cycle is clogged by
having no place to store the spent fuel. Without either full core dis-
charge capacity or spent-fuel storage capacity available over the life-
time of the reactor, a new plant may not be certified. Section
25524.1(b) thus bars certification of any new nuclear power plant in
California in the absence of an unclogged fuel cycle as effectively as
section 25524.2 bars certification of any new nuclear power plants in
California in the absence of a permanent waste disposal method.'
8 6
The operation of section 25524.1(b) is "in no way hypothethical or
speculative." Just as the court found that it would work a substantial
hardship on utilities to delay review of section 25524.2 until the ques-
tion of its constitutionality arose in a particular certification proceed-
ing, it should have found the same in considering the effect of not
ruling on section 25524.1(b).
The court held that the rest of the statutes dealing with power
plant siting were not ripe'8 7 because they had never been applied and
183. Id
184. The NFCC DRAFT REPORT, supra note 130, at 113, recommended that the spent
"fuel storage facilities should be designed to provide safe storage for all spent fuel accumu-
lated during the reactor lifetime for up to fifty years after plant shutdown." The final report
made no mention of this. In re Implementation of Nuclear Reprocessing and Waste Dispo-
sal Statutes, Final Report, Nos. 76-NL-1, 76-NL-3 (Cal. Energy Resources Conservation &
Dev. Comm'n Sept. 13, 1978).
185. For a discussion of full-core discharge capacity, note 134 supra.
186. After holding §§ 25524.1 & 25524.3 not ripe, the court went on to consider
§ 25524.2. "Although sections 25524.1(a) and 25524.3 pose no present barrier to the devel-
opment of nuclear power in California, we cannot say the same of section 25524.2." 659
F.2d at 918. Apparently, the court also felt it could not say the same of section 25524.1(b).
Thus, why it refused to hold it ripe for review is puzzling, to say the least.
187. The court found the following sections of the California Public Resources Code not
ripe for judicial review: § 25500 (conditions construction or modification of any power plant
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the court refused to speculate either on how the statutes might be ap-
plied in the future' 8 or on the purpose of the information sought and
how it would be utilized by the Energy Commission. The court rea-
soned that the threat that the statutes might be unconstitutionally ap-
plied in the future did not make a substantial immediate impact on the
utilities sufficient to present a ripe issue.
The court's own rationale in holding the waste disposal provision
ripe for review, however, supports the opposite view-that the other
certification requirements in the Warren-Alquist Act are also ripe for
review. First, the issue is fit for judicial decision because it is purely
legal-whether or not the Warren-Alquist Act has imposed unconstitu-
tional substantive and procedural burdens on nuclear power develop-
ment. The mere existence of these burdens, not the possibility of
unconstitutional interpretation, creates the constitutional issue.
Second, to delay adjudication would work substantial hardship on
the utilities. As the court reasoned in holding the waste disposal provi-
sion ripe for review, the utilities would be placed in a quandary by
on Energy Commission certification); § 25502 (establishes notice of intention requirement);
§ 25504 (describes content of the notice of intention); § 25511 (requires the Energy Commis-
sion to review safety and reliability of the proposed facility); § 25512 (requires the Energy
Commission to make findings on the information submitted and to identify issues to be
considered later); § 25514 (describes what the final report on the notice of intention shall
contain); § 25516 (requires two alternate sites before notice of intention approval); § 25517
(requires certification before construction and restoration of cite if certification is denied);
§ 25519 (establishes application for certification requirement); § 25520 (describes contents of
application for certification); § 25523 (describes content of Energy Commission's Ruling on
application for certification); § 25528 (authorizes the Energy Commission to control land use
surrounding a facility); § 25532 (requires the Energy Commission to monitor the construc-
tion and operation of a certified facility). 659 F.2d at 916.
188. 659 F.2d at 916. The court's statement that the statutes have never been applied is
misleading. PG&E did submit a notice of intention for the Stanislaus Nuclear Project on
August 30, 1977 (Docket No. 77-NOI-3), which the court accurately notes was rejected for
insufficient data. 659 F.2d at 916 n.2. PG&E had submitted information only as it felt
§§ 25502 and 25504 required. "The inclusion by Applicant of information in this document
other than that specified in section 25504 of the Public Resources Code is not acknowledg-
ment of the relevance thereof in NOI proceedings." Docket No. 77-NOI-3 at I-1. The NOI
was returned thirty days later because "the NOI did not contain information required by
Commission regulations in sufficient detail to permit an adequate staff analysis." CALIFOR-
NIA ENERGY COMM'N, STAFF REPORT ON DATA ADEQUACY, PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC CO.
STANISLAUs NUCLEAR PROJECT 2 (Docket No. 77-NOI-3) (Nov. 1977). The report based its
rejection on § 25511, which "expressly requires that detailed information be provided in the
NOI on matters relating to safety and reliability." Id at 3. Although the commission was
ordered to accept the NOI (which PG&E never did resubmit), Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v.
State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, No. 732-870 (Cal. Super. Ct., memo-
randum of intended decision May 22, 1978; stipulated judgment entered Aug.. 15, 1978), this
order did not change the interpretation given the statutes by the commission in its rejection
of the NOI. The court must have overlooked these events when it said, "We have no way of
knowing what types of information the Energy Commission might require of the utilities."
659 F.2d at 916.
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being forced either to abandon their plans to use nuclear power (with
the result that the challenges to the Warren-Alquist Act would never be
ripe) or to make massive expenditures' 89 for nuclear power with the
hope that the burdensome siting procedures would be invalidated. By
declaring these statutes not ripe, the court left them open to attack at
each stage of the state regulatory process.' 90 The litigation over the
constitutionality of that process could discourage the utilities from pro-
ceeding with any plans for new nuclear power plants. Thus, the court
should have considered all of the challenged provisions of the Warren-
Alquist Act ripe for review.
A. Express Preemption
The court in Pacfc Legal Foundation concluded that "Congress
intended to preempt only state regulation of radiation hazards associ-
ated with nuclear power, and not state regulation for other pur-
poses."' 91 States may therefore regulate nuclear power for economic,
environmental, and nonradiological safety purposes. This holding is
consistent with the statutory scheme created under the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954, the 1959 amendments, the opinions of the United States
Supreme Court and various lower courts, as well as with the position of
the NRC.' 92 It is well settled that any statute that postpones or pre-
vents the certification of a nuclear power plant because of a concern for
radiation hazards should be preempted. If enacted for any other rea-
son, such a statute should be upheld as a valid exercise of state power.
1. Section 25524.1
Section 25524.1(a), 193 California's reprocessing provision, was
designed to insure that nuclear power would be able to meet rather
than aggravate California's energy needs. The legislature was well
aware both of the industry's reliance on reprocessing to dispose of the
189. According to its brief, PG&E spent at least $10 million on the Stanislaus project as
of August 30, 1977. Appellees' Brief at 15, Pacpc Legal Found, 659 F.2d 903 (9th Cir.
1981).
190. The issues which arose in the Stanislaus notice of intention, note 188 supra, inevita-
bly will arise again should the utilities submit another notice. The court thus invites litiga-
tion by not passing upon the constitutionality of the notice requirements as applied in the
Stanislaus proceedings.
191. 659 F.2d at 922.
192. See notes 52-80 and accompanying text supra.
193. See note 175 supra. Section 25524.1(a) is confusing since only breeder reactors tech-
nologically require reprocessing, and the statute seemingly is intended to apply to all types
of reactors (otherwise it would have been unnecessary to exempt the already existing LWR
reactors in California). The legislature therefore must have intended to address economic
rather than technological requirements, that is, to have the section apply to plants which
require reprocessing to close the fuel cycle or to prove a continuous supply of uranium fuel.
See NFCC DRAFT REPORT, supra note 130, at 29.
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spent fuel and of the upcoming crisis if reprocessing did not become a
viable method of unclogging the nuclear fuel cycle and preventing the
shutdown of reactors due to full spent-fuel pools. Indeed, when the
nuclear bill was passed in 1976, reprocessing was considered the only
method of preventing such a shutdown.194 By denying certification to
plants that use reprocessing to unclog the fuel cycle when the actual
reprocessing method is technologically unavailable, California tried to
avoid the same mistake that threatened, and continues to threaten, pre-
mature closure of many existing reactors. This is a valid economic
rather than a prohibited safety motivation.1 95 Section 25524.1(a)
should therefore be held constitutional as within state regulatory
powers.
Section 25524.1(b), the reprocessing and spent-fuel storage provi-
sion, is also economically motivated. While section 25524. 1(a) sought
to prevent undue reliance on reprocessing, section 25524. 1(b) sought to
insure that the fuel cycle would be unclogged even without reliance on
reprocessing. The threat of premature closure, considered serious dur-
ing the hearings on Proposition 15,196 is even more acute today.
197
"Section 25524.1(b) attempts to secure assurances prior to plant certifi-
cation that adequate capacity is expected to be available either through
reprocessing or expanded storage to prevent shutdown of the reactor
due to accumulating backlogs of spent fuel."' 98 Since the effect of this
section is simply to deny certification unless the fuel cycle is unclogged,
194. NFCC DRAFT REPORT, supra note 130, at 8. See also notes 127-34 and accompany-
ing text supra.
195. In fact, there are no safety reasons for preferring either reprocessed or
nonreprocessed fuel. Reprocessing neither increases nor decreases the radiation hazards of
spent fuel. Although reprocessing changes the nature of the high-level wastes, it does not
change the nature or magnitude of the disposal problem. Reprocessing reduces the volume
occupied by the fission products but contaminates other materials with plutonium and other
long-lived isotopes. Partitioning these long-lived species could reduce the long-term risks
but would create new short-term risks. "The possible reduction in long-term risks is small, if
it exists at all." IssuES AND CHOICES, supra note 120, at 329.
196. See text accompanying notes 156-57 supra.
197. The nuclear plant at Rancho Seco, California, will run out of full-core discharge
capacity (FCDC) in 1984 and will use up all of its storage space in 1987 unless more spent
fuel storage space is found. Unit I at the San Onofre, California, plant ran out of FCDC in
1980 and will use up its storage space in 1983. San Onofre is shipping some of its waste to
the G.E. Morris site in Illinois until its new unit comes on line. 126 CONG. REC. S10247
(daily ed. July 30, 1980). The Illinois legislature passed a law banning importation of spent
fuel from another state unless the other state had standards similar to Illinois regarding
spent fuel storage and had entered into a reciprocity agreement with Illinois. -The Illinois
Attorney General filed suit to prevent the shipments, commenting, "let them [Southern Cali-
fornia Edison] take their waste that they want to haul here and move it right next door."
Wall St. J., Dec. 29, 1980, at 4, col. 7. The law was held to be unconstitutional, however, as
violative of the supremacy and commerce clauses. General Elec. Co. v. Falner, No. 80 Civ.
6835 (N.D. I. Oct. 12, 1981).
198. NFCC DRAFT REPORT, supra note 130, at 101.
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its economic justification cannot be disputed. Thus, not only should it
have been held ripe for review, it should also have been held a constitu-
tionally valid economic regulation of nuclear power.
2. Section 25524.2
In addition to finding section 25524.2,19 the waste disposal provi-
sion, ripe for review, the court found that it was an economic provision
designed to unclog the fuel cycle. The court relied heavily upon state-
ments of purpose and intent in the Reassessment to reach this conclu-
sion.2°° It reasoned that because this provision did not specifically
require a safe federally approved permanent disposal method, it was
not a safety regulation. The court focused its analysis of intent on the
words in the statute and in the legislative history. As an economic reg-
ulation of nuclear power, therefore, the court held that it was not ex-
pressly preempted.
An examination of the operation of the statute compels a contrary
conclusion.2 0 1 Because the court failed to review section 25524.1(b), it
did not perceive the relationship between section 25524.1(b), section
25524.2, and the unclogging of the fuel cycle. Once full core discharge
capacity, reprocessing, or spent-fuel storage space is required over the
lifetime of the reactor, the fuel cycle is thereby unclogged. Requiring
any other storage or disposal method is then economically unnecessary.
Since section 25524. 1(b) entirely provides for the unclogging of the fuel
cycle, any other provision with the same purpose would be superflu-
ous.2°2 The waste disposal provision, therefore, is not needed for the
alleged economic purpose of unclogging the fuel cycle. The reproces-
sing and spent-fuel storage provision by itself alleviates any economic
problems of the nuclear fuel cycle. As long as section 25524.1(b) is in
effect, section 25524.2 will have no impact upon the economics of the
fuel cycle. Section 25524.2 thus has no valid economic foundation.0 3
199. See note 175 supra.
200. See note 173 and accompanying text supra.
201. So does an examination of several admissions in Energy Commission reports. See
note 194 and accompanying text supra (reprocessing was considered the only method to
unclog the fuel cycle when the amendments were passed); text accompanying note 207 infra
(stressing that it is the ability to dispose of the wastes safely which needs confirmation).
202. If such other provision had the sole purpose of unclogging the fuel cycle, then it
would be impossible to tell which one would be superfluous. However, if such other provi-
sion possibly had dual purposes, it is more likely that the legislature enacted two provisions
to achieve two distinct goals rather than to enact two provisions to achieve only one goal. It
should be presumed that the legislature enacted the two provisions with the intent that both
would be effective.
203. It cannot be argued that permanent disposal is a more economical method of un-
clogging the fuel cycle. Permanent and temporary waste disposal costs are an insignificant
fraction of the total cost of nuclear power, IRG REPORT, supra note 7, at 67; Assembly
Comm: Staff Background Papers, supra note I, § 3, at 1.
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Hence, the court's failure to examine section 25524.1 is more than
just an isolated error. It affects the most important aspect of the deci-
sion-that the waste disposal provision was economically motivated
and therefore constitutional. Had the court looked at the operation of
and motivation for section 25524.1, it could not have held the waste
disposal provision constitutional.
The only other possible motivation for section 25524.2 is radiologi-
cal safety. Waste disposal has been considered a problem primarily be-
cause of the radioactive hazards posed by the wastes. 2° The California
legislature has never disputed this;20 5 in fact, one Energy Commission
report states that "[it] is the ability to dispose of wastes safely which
needs confirmation. '20 6 This report also says that "[t]he ultimate pur-
pose of a waste disposal technology is to confine and isolate wastes
from the biosphere for long periods, hundreds or thousands of
years. 20 7 Proposition 15, partially motivated by radiological safety
concerns, 20 8 also contained a permanent waste disposal provision.
Since section 25524.2 was enacted to take the place of the voter referen-
dum, it was apparently motivated by a similar concern: radiological
safety hazards posed by the lack of permanent and safe waste disposal
technology.
20 9
In sum, section 25524.2 lacks a valid economic justification and
should have been held expressly preempted as a state regulation of nu-
clear power for the protection from radiation hazards.
3. Section 25524.3
Section 25524.3 requires a study by the Energy Commission on the
effectiveness, necessity, and economic feasibility of underground siting
before any new nuclear power plants can be certified. If the study finds
undergrounding desirable, the Commission is authorized to require un-
dergrounding. Because the Energy Commission's report found the ad-
ded cost of undergrounding outweighed the added safety, and thus
recommended that "underground siting should not be mandated,"21 0
204. See notes 135-51 and accompanying text supra.
205. "The chances of premature waste release pose risks to the public for hundreds of
years into the future." REASSESSMENT, supra note 124, at 67. "One must assure isolation of
radioactive waste from the biosphere to such an extent that resultant health effects from
potential human exposure are acceptably low." NFCC DRAFT REPORT, Supra note 130,
at 133.
206. NFCC DRAFT REPORT, supra note 130, at 133 (emphasis in original).
207. Id at 127.
208. See note 152 supra.
209. This argument was raised in the Appellees' Brief at 16-21, Pacftc LegalFound, 659
F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1981).
210. CALIFORNIA ENERGY COMMISSION, UNDERGROUND SITING OF NUCLEAR POWER
REACTORS: AN OPTION FOR CALIFORNIA: A SUMMARY OF THE TECHNICAL AND Eco-
NOMIC IMPLICATIONS WITH RECOMMENDATIONS, xi, 9-4 (Draft June 1978).
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the court ruled section 25524.3 moot. Since section 25524.3 does not
impose siting restrictions upon any plants that may be proposed in the
future, and has imposed no such restrictions in the past, the court's
ruling was correct. Nevertheless, if undergrounding had been required,
this section would be preempted because the purpose of underground-
ing is the protection of society from radiation hazards.2
4. The Warren-A quist 4ct
Section 25503, the three-site requirement, was the only section of
the Warren-Alquist Act that was held ripe for review. The court in
Pacftc Legal Foundation held that the provision was designed to
"provid[e] California with an efficient means of deciding where a pro-
posed power plant should be located. Such decisions have been re-
garded as within the states' authority, for nuclear as well as other
power plants. 212
The same logic applies to the rest of the challenged provisions
213
of the Warren-Alquist Act. California enacted the Warren-Alquist Act
to streamline and to simplify the power plant siting process.214 Al-
though the California legislature was interested in protecting the envi-
ronment, there is nothing to suggest that the siting provisions were
specifically designed to protect the public from radiation hazards.
The Warren-Alquist Act applies to all thermal power plants: fed-
eral licensees and nuclear plants are not subject to preferential or dis-
criminatory treatment. The Supreme Court has said that although a
state may not infringe on preempted ground, it would uphold "'rea-
sonable, nondiscriminatory conservation and environmental protection
measures imposed' by a State."2 5 The Warren-Alquist Act is this type
211. Faced with the inability to regulate safety systems directly in order to reduce the
probabilities of an accident, which it felt were too high, the legislature looked at ways to
soften the consequences should one of the reactor safety systems fail. Assembly Comm.:
Staff Background Papers, supra note 1, at §§ 2, 41-45. For example, California looked at
alternate design (nonLWR) technologies and alternate siting procedures (undergrounding,
offshore, and berm containment). Some of the nonsafety reasons for undergrounding which
were suggested in the legislature's hearings, such as aesthetics, proximity to load center sit-
ing, and better protection in case of war were discredited in the Energy Commission's report
on undergrounding. See note 175 supra. Another study concluded, "It has become clear to
us from our survey of the literature that the dominant motivation for undergrounding is to
enhance the safety of the power plant. ... [W]e have concluded that those who do not
wish to accept WASH-1400 (the Rasmussen Report) as the definitive statement on the safety
of nuclear power are on sound ground, and the examination of underground siting as it
affects safety is a fruitful endeavor." R. MILES, JR. & M. GOLDSMITH, DECISION ANALYSIS
FRAMEWORK FOR THE UNDERGROUND SITING OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 1-1, 1-2 (1977).
212. 659 F.2d at 925.
213. See note 187 supra.
214. See notes 89-101 and accompanying text supra.
215. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 164 (1978) (quoting Douglas v. Seacoast
Prod., Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 277 (1977)).
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of nondiscriminatory conservation and environmental protection meas-
ure and should have been upheld as a constitutional exercise of state
power.
B. Implied Preemption
1. Occupation of the Field
Although the court in Pacjfc Legal Foundation recognized the
doctrine of preemption by occupation of the field,"1 6 it applied only the
express and conflict preemption tests to the California regulations. The
court should have examined whether or not the Atomic Energy Act was
evidence of occupation in the field for nonradiation hazards. It appears
to have reasoned that since there is express preemption to regulate for
radiation hazards in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the 1959
amendments, there is no implied preemption by occupation of the field
to regulate for nonradiation hazards. In light of the intentional ambi-
guity surrounding this preemption in the 1959 amendments and the de-
sire to avoid explicitly stating the precise areas of preemption, such an
implication was unwarranted. 17 The court's preemption analysis was
thus incomplete. Upon examination of the issue, however, the practical
result is the same.
The doubtful validity of implied preemption by occupation of the
field is illustrated by applying the factors listed in Rice v. Santa Fe Ele-
vator Corp.,213 to the California regulations on nonradiation hazards
(i.e., those regulations that have motivations other than to provide for
protection from radiation hazards).2 19 First, the pervasiveness of the
federal regulations is not evidence of preemptive intent. Regulations of
a complex and highly technical engineering system must, by circum-
stance, be elaborate and detailed. A pervasive scheme is required to
insure that not a single person is harmed from a potentially deadly
source.
As discussed earlier,220 a court rarely looks to the subject matter
alone to determine if national uniformity is desired. A court prefers to
look at congressional intent with respect to national uniformity. Nev-
ertheless, the nonradiation aspects of nuclear power do not compel na-
tional uniformity. There is no inherent uniform preference for power
produced by fission. States have different physical environments, cli-
mates, energy demands, and natural resources.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that it will not find pre-
emption of state regulations for the sole reason that they coincide with
216. 659 F.2d at 919.
217. See note 70 and accompanying text supra.
218. 331 U.S. 218 (1947). See text accompanying notes 28-32 supra.
219. See notes 28-32 accompanying text supra.
220. See notes 45-46 and accompanying text supra.
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the federal regulations.2 Similarity of regulations, without more, will
not bring about preemption. That the NRC requires certain informa-
tion about nuclear reactors does not mean that the states cannot require
the same information.222
Until 1971, the NRC's responsibilities were "confined to scrutiny
of and protection against hazards from radiation. 223 It was not until
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)224 was inter-
preted to require all federal agencies to consider the environmental
consequences of their actions "'to the fullest extent possible'" that the
NRC considered matters other than radiation hazards. 225 Therefore,
because the NRC exercises NEPA jurisdiction over matters other than
protection against radiation hazards, arguing that states are forbidden
to regulate these nonradiological hazard areas concurrently is tanta-
mount to arguing that NEPA preempted state jurisdiction over those
areas. NEPA itself contains no such suggestion of preemption.226 Im-
plied preemption by occupation of the field does not exist in the area of
regulation of nuclear power for nonradiological hazards. The states are




The court in Pacc Legal Foundation held that state regulations
that actually conflict with federal regulations were preempted. Actual
conflict occurs "if compliance with both federal and state regulations
[is] impossible." '227  Without analysis, the court concluded that
"[c]ompliance with both federal and California laws is possible in the
present case,"' 228 and thus no preemption resulted. The court did note,
however, that there was a possibility that section 25524.2 might conflict
with federal law should California ever prohibit a federally approved
221. See, e.g., California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 730 (1949) (similarity in purpose and
objectives of a state and federal statute does not mean automatic invalidity of state meas-
ures. "Coincidence is only one factor ... guiding us to congressional intent"). See also
Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines, 372 U.S. 714 (1963).
222. Power Auth. v. New York, NUCLEAR REQ. REP. (CCH) 20,105 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
223. New Hampshire v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 406 F.2d 170, 175 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 962 (1969). The court in that case noted that "[tihe history of the
1954 legislation reveals that the Congress, in thinking of the public's health and safety, had
in mind only the special hazards of radioactivity." 406 F.2d at 174.
224. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4369 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
225. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449
F.2d 1109, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
226. Id
227. 659 F.2d at 926.
228. Id
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method of waste disposal.22 9 Since this was only a possibility of con-
flict, and not a necessary conflict, the court correctly did not find
preemption.
230
The same result should have been reached with respect to the
Warren-Alquist Act and section 25524.1, the reprocessing amendment.
Neither the Warren-Alquist Act nor the reprocessing provision actually
conflicts with federal law. The Warren-Alquist siting procedures are
required to be followed in addition to the NRC licensing procedures.
2 3'
There is nothing in the Warren-Alquist Act that prevents a utility from
complying with any of the NRC regulations. Furthermore, there are
no federal reprocessing requirements with which section 25524.1 can
conflict.
Although there is no actual conflict, there is still the possibility that
the Warren-Alquist Act, as amended, could conflict with federal law.
The Energy Commission could use its broad siting authority to regulate
for radiation hazards as was proposed in the hearings on Proposition
15.2 Nevertheless, a court must avoid "seeking out conflicts between
state and federal regulation where none clearly exists." '233 When there
is merely a possibility of conflict, a court may use purpose to reconcile
the two schemes.234 In this case, the purpose of the federal scheme is
safety related, while that of the state scheme is environmental and eco-
nomic. This mere possibility of conflict, when there is a clear way to
reconcile the two statutes, is thus insufficient to support preemption.
b. Obstacle Conflict
A state regulation is preempted, even when it is not in actual con-
flict with federal law, if it stands as an obstacle to the purposes and
objectives of Congress. 235 The court correctly observed that the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954 did not intend to "promote nuclear power at all
costs. '236 After examining the 1954 Act and subsequent legislation
229. Id at 925.
230. The court cited Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 554 (1973), for the view that
only necessary conflicts result in preemption. 659 F.2d at 925 n.35. See note 44 and accom-
panying text supra.
231. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 25500 (West 1977) prevents any provisions of the Warren-
Alquist Act from imposing requirements that conflict with federal law: "The issuance of a
certificate by the commission shall be in lieu of any permit, certificate, or similar document
required by any state, local, or regional agency, or federal agency to the extentpermitted by
federal law, for such use of the site and related facilities, and shall supersede any applicable
statute, ordinance, or regulation of any state, local, or regional agency, or federal agency to
the extent permitted by federal law." Id. (emphasis added).
232. See text accompanying notes 168-70 supra.
233. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 446 (1960).
234. See notes 38 & 41-44 and accompanying text supra.
235. See notes 22-26 and accompanying text supra.
236. 659 F.2d at 925.
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touching upon energy and nuclear power, it held that -[i]nherent in the
states' regulatory authority is the power to keep nuclear plants from
being built, if the plants are inconsistent with the states' power needs,
or environmental or other interests. 12 37 Because the court had previ-
ously determined that sections 25503 and 25524.2 are environmental
and economic regulations of nuclear power, the court held that they did
not "impermissibly interfere with a federal goal of promoting nuclear
power. ' 238 The same result should have been reached with respect to
the Warren-Alquist Act and the reprocessing provision. The Act is
nondiscriminatory; it applies to nonnuclear as well as to nuclear gener-
ated electricity. In addition, the reprocessing amendment is designed
to further the state's energy needs. These are simply economic and en-
vironmental provisions. Moreover, given that there is no federal policy
to promote nuclear power at all costs, a federal license is a "permit to
construct a power plant, not a Federal order to do SO." ' 2 39 A state policy
that does not select nuclear power as the prime method of meeting its
energy needs on the basis of economic and environmental considera-
tions does not interfere with federal nuclear policy. The Warren-Al-
quist Act and the reprocessing amendment are therefore no obstacle to
federal policy.
The court's conclusion that section 25524.2 is not preempted by
federal policy, however, was made without consideration of an impor-
tant factor: Section 25524.2 directly conflicts with NRC policy. That
policy is to continue licensing despite the absence of a federally ap-
proved technology.24° Congress, too, is "aware of the absence of a per-
manent waste disposal facility, but [has] decided to proceed with power
plant licensing."2 4' Although California is apparently prohibitmig nu-
clear power for a reason that the NRC has deemed insufficient to pro-
hibit nuclear power, the court did not apply the conflict preemption test
to this policy. This result was reached notwithstanding the court's own
language. "State regulations which directly conflict with regulations of
the NRC would, of course, be preempted even if they were enacted for
purposes other than protection against radiation hazards." 242 If the
237. Id
238. Id
239. Marshall v. Consumers Power Co., 65 Mich. App. 237, 259, 237 N.W.2d 266, 280
(1975).
240. See notes 147-51 and accompanying text supra.
241. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 582 F.2d 166, 170 (2d Cir. 1978). See note 150 supra.
242. 659 F.2d at 922 n.29. The rest of footnote 29 states, "If the NRC required a nuclear
plant to be constructed in a certain way for safety reasons, for example, a state could not
require the plant to be constructed some other way for environmental reasons." But f. Ray
v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978) (states could impose additional nonsafety de-
sign regulations on ships that had complied with federal safety design regulations); Huron
Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960) (conflicting state regulations
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court felt that state regulations that conflict with NRC policy are pre-
empted, then it should have preempted section 25524.2.
PG&E also contended that the challenged statutes created the pos-
sibility of conflict between the Energy Commission and the NRC,
which in turn creates a burden on the utilities and an obstacle to the
federal objective of promoting nuclear power.243 The history of the
scope of nuclear power regulation in California, however, evidences the
remoteness of this possibility and hence the absence of grounds for pre-
emption. The CPUC, which for years has had the same broad author-
ity as the Energy Commission now has,2' has never used its power in
an unconstitutional manner. Two out of four of California's existing
nuclear power plants were threatened by the possibility of being regu-
lated in an unconstitutional manner, yet neither actually was. 245 The
enacted for nonpreempted purposes will not be preempted unless they exclude federally
licensed activity). See notes 38-44 and accompanying text supra.
243. Appellees' Brief at 62-90, Pacfic Legal Found, 659 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1981).
244. See notes 89-93 and accompanying text supra.
245. When San Diego Gas & Electric and Southern California Edison sought a certifi-
cate of public convenience and necessity from the CPUC for the San Onofre Nuclear Gener-
ating Station, the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC), "[a]fter carefully
considering the entire record in this proceeding, and setting aside the matter of radiation
hazards which are under AEC jurisdiction," granted the certificate conditioned on AEC
approval of the safety systems. Southern Cal. Edison Co. & San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 62
Op. & Ord. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Cal. 651, 660 (1964).
When Pacific Gas & Electric sought certification for its Diablo Canyon nuclear power
plant, the CPUC heard testimony on the emergency core-cooling system, the reactor con-
tainment structure, the costs of the plant, and the suitability of the site. The commission
found that "It]here is no evidence in the record concerning safety within our jurisdiction
which would cause us to reject the proposed project as being unsafe." Pacific Gas & Elec.
Co., 62 Op. & Ord. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Cal. 639, 649 (1967). "Radiation hazards are
subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the [AEC]" Id at 647 n.l. "[W]e recognize our
responsibility to insure that the impact on the environment will be held to a minimum and
that aesthetics will receive adequate consideration." Id at 649.
The CPUC has consistently followed the California Supreme Court's decision in North-
ern Cal. Ass'n to Preserve Bodega Head & Harbor, Inc. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 61 Cal. 2d
126, 200 P.2d 200, 37 Cal. Rptr. 432 (1964), that the states have jurisdiction over environ-
mental matters, but not over radiation hazards. See Consumers Arise Now v. Pacific Gas
and Elec. Co., 72 Op. & Ord. Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Cal. 261 (1971) (dismissal of allega-
tions that planned nuclear power plants along the coastline would radioactively contaminate
the environment); People's Lobby v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 73 Op. & Ord. Pub. Util.
Comm'n of Cal. 652 (1972) (complaint alleging that San Onofre nuclear generating station
was unsafe because of flaws in the ECCS dismissed because "[T]he Federal government has
the exclusive authority. . . to regulate plant safety which involves radiation hazards." Id
at 659); Order Denying Petition to Set Aside Submissions and Reopen Proceedings For the
Taking of New Evidence With Respect to Decisions, Nos. 73278 and 75471, Decision No.
92058, Op. & Ord. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Cal. (July 29, 1980) (denial of petition to reopen
the proceedings which led to the granting of certificates of public convenience and necessity
to PG&E for the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant). The CPUC believed that "if there
are grounds for precluding or delaying operation of the Diablo units, those grounds would
be based on concerns about radiological safety and health. . . . Issues pertaining to radio-
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possibility of conflict between the CPUC and the NRC has never been
an obstacle to the development of nuclear power in California, and the
Energy Commission has no more authority than has the CPUC to in-
vade federally preempted areas.
Furthermore, the Energy Commission has never overstepped its
bounds. In the two notices of intention that the Commission has
processed, one was approved,246 without the imposition of any regula-
tions for radiation hazards, and the other was returned because, in view
of section 25511, it contained insufficient detail.247 The Energy Com-
mission thus has not trespassed into any preempted areas. There is no
indication that it will in the future.
248
The requirement in section 25511 to submit information to the En-
ergy Commission involves no substantial burden on a utility. The
NRC requires the same information.249 Since 1970, the CPUC,
through General Order 131,250 has required the same information to be
logical safety are not within the jurisdiction or expertise of this Commission. The federal
government has preempted authority over such issues delegating exclusive responsibility to
the NRC." Id at 2, 3.
246. California Energy Commission, In the Matter of: San Diego Gas & Electric Co.,
Notice of Intention to File Application for Certification of Site and Related Facilities: Deci-
sion (Docket No. 76-NOI-2) (Dec. 21, 1977). San Diego Gas & Electric never filed the
application for certification for this plant (Sundesert) because the commission refused to
exempt it from the waste disposal requirement of § 25524.2. Economics was also an impor-
tant factor in the decision to terminate the project. CALIFORNIA ENERGY COMM'N, REPORT
TO THE LEGISLATURE, AB 1852: ALTERNATIVES TO A SUNDESERT NUCLEAR PROJECT
(Docket No. 77-NL-I). Thus, Sundesert was not terminated because of any abuse of the
Warren-Alquist siting authority.
247. See note 188 supra.
248. During one of the trials in the federal district court, William R. Gould, President of
Southern California Edison, was unable to pinpoint any of the California laws that he felt
would be applied unconstitutionally. Instead, he testified that Southern Cal. Edison "would
not go ahead with the notice of intention procedures with these laws on the book knowing
fully well the political posture in this state (from its chief executive office, Governor Brown)
on down through the regulatory commissions (including the CPUC) is definitely anti-nu-
clear." Reporter's Transcript at 178, PaciFc Legal Found, 472 F. Supp. 191 (S.D. Cal. 1979).
Political disputes, however, are best resolved in branches of the government other than the
judiciary. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
249. See Appellees' Brief at 77-90, Pacfic Legal Found, 659 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1981).
250. CPUC General Order No. 131, Rules Relating to the Planning and Construction of
Electrical Generating and Transmission Facilities, 71 Op. & Ord. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Cal
156 (1970), required the CPUC to consider the environmental impact of the proposed facil-
ity as well as the energy needs of the public. No certificate was to be issued unless the
facilities are "necessary to promote the safety, health, comfort, and convenience bf the pub-
lic. . . ." Id at 157.
The General Order also required every certificate to include the following: why the
plant was needed; "[slafety and reliability information including planned provisions for
emergency operations and shutdowns"; plant costs; capacity factors; fuel costs; design; con-
struction and site information (geologic, seismic, water supply, population data, availability
of alternate sites, and justification for the site adopted); descriptions of the facilities and
control systems; and information on the environmental impact of the plant. Id
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provided by the utilities as section 25511 of the challenged law now
requires. The utilities have not found General Order 131 to be a bur-
den,25' and they have not challenged the CPUC procedures in any liti-
gation. If the process of obtaining state approval for a nuclear power
plant were an obstacle to federal objectives, then state regulation of
nuclear power for any reason would be preempted. The burden of bu-




The court in Pacef Legal Foundation should have considered all
the challenged statutes to be ripe for review. Whether or not they were
preempted is a purely legal question at the present time and does not
depend on how they may be applied in the future. By declining to hear
the preemption question with respect to all the statutes on the merits,
the court has contributed to uncertainty in the law.
The court was correct, however, in upholding the constitutionality
of section 25503. Had the court addressed the constitutionality of the
reprocessing provision and the rest of the Warren-Alquist Act, it should
also have upheld these provisions for the same reasons. They are valid
economic and environmental regulations, they conflict with no federal
policy or regulations, and they pose no obstacles to congressional
objectives.
The court was incorrect in upholding section 25524.2, the waste
disposal provision. Since section 25524. 1(b) alone insures that no new
reactors will be certified as long as the fuel cycle is clogged, section
251. In granting Southern Cal. Edison and San Diego Gas & Electric the authority to
construct two additional nuclear power units at San Onofre, the CPUC, pursuant to General
Order, 131, note 250 supra, considered loss of coolant accident prevention, the emergency
core-cooling system, waste management, emissions, spent-fuel handling and storage capabil-
ities, environmental protection, and the economics of the proposed units. The CPUC con-
cluded "There is no evidence within our juridiction which would cause us to reject proposed
San Onofre Units 2 and 3 as being unsafe." 72 Op. & Ord Pub. Util. Comm'n ofCal., 53, 66
(1971).
Although it may be contended that "a State cannot constitutionally burden an applicant
with furnishing information for the purpose of informing decisions that are forbidden to be
made," Respondents' Brief 75-76, Op. & Ord. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Cal., 659 F.2d 903 (9th
Cir. 1981), one who submits information cannot know beforehand for what purpose is will
be used. For example, information on the reliability of the safety systems may be used to
determine the operational reliability of the plant as a whole, rather than to regulate for
protection from radiation hazards. See, e.g., Declaration of John Bryson (President of the
CPUC) in support of Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment, Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation &
Dev. Comm'n, 489 F. Supp. 699 (E.D. Cal. 1980). Allowing the applicant to decide which
information is necessary for the state to make its review removes the substance from the
power of review.
252. Power Auth. v. New York, NUCLEAR REr. RaP. (CCH) 20,105 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
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25524.2 has no reasonable economic rationale; rather, because it is in-
tended to protect the public from the deadly radioactive wastes pro-
duced in the reactor, it can only be a radiological safety regulation.
Congress has said that the federal government has the sole responsibil-
ity for regulating in that area. Section 25524.2 should have been ruled
unconstitutional on the grounds of express preemption.253 Alterna-
tively, it should have been ruled unconstitutional on the basis of con-
flict preemption since it is contrary to the NRC policy of licensing new
plants despite the absence of a waste disposal technology.
In light of its state oriented view toward preemption, it appears
that if presented with the question, the Court will uphold all of the
Warren-Alquist Act and the reprocessing amendment (section 25524.1).
Only the waste disposal provision meets the Court's narrow grounds
for preemption. Indeed, Pacftc LegalFoundation provides an excellent
opportunity for the court to reaffirm its state oriented approach to find-
ing preemption only when that is "the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress.
254
Those favoring limiting federal intrusion into areas of basic state
concerns, such as local economics, health and safety, land use, and the
environment, should welcome such a result. Traditional state functions
should not be displaced without either a clear and express federal com-
mand or an actual conflict between the federal and state regulatory
schemes. Absent a federal policy giving priority to nuclear power as an
energy source, the states should be able to apply their traditional gov-
ernmental authority to prevent local utilities from developing this par-
ticular type of power.
If another state wishes to follow California's lead and impose its
own moratorium on the development of nuclear power, it would be
wise not to rely too heavily on the California scheme as upheld by the
Ninth Circuit in PacYc Legal Foundation. The Ninth Circuit did not
completely analyze California's statutes, and another court may take
note of the relationship between the reprocessing and spent-fuel storage
provision and the waste disposal provision to find the latter unconstitu-
tional. A state legislature wishing to condition the development of nu-
clear power on the existence of a permanent waste disposal method
should avoid enacting a provision similar to California's Public Re-
253. As mentioned previously, see note 8 supra, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
after this note already had gone to press. As urged by the United States Department of
Justice, Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae for Certiorari at 1, 20, the Court will
only review the ripeness and constitutionality of §§ 25524.1(b) and 25524.2. Perhaps coinci-
dentally, as part of its Brief, the Justice Department argued that § 25524.2 is economically
unnecessary in view of § 25524.1(b) and thus is purely a safety provision, considering that it
was enacted as an alternative to Proposition 15, whose undisputed motivation was protec-
tion from radiation hazards. Brief at 17, 18.
254. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
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sources Code section 25524.1. Absent a reprocessing or spent-fuel stor-
age provision accompanying a permanent waste disposal requirement,
it would be difficult to determine the real motivation underlying the
waste disposal provision. Although the suggested scheme would not
preclude a court from holding that the waste disposal provision was
motivated by impermissible safety concerns, such a conclusion would
be more difficult to reach.
Congress originally preempted state regulation of nuclear power
for radiological hazards because it believed that the states were not
technologically capable of protecting the public from those hazards.
2 5
It also originally intended to give the states greater regulatory responsi-
bilities as their technological capabilities developed.256 These inten-
tions, however, merely supported the imposition of minimum federal
safety standards. Congress has never intended to prevent the states
from providing additional protection to its citizens. The Atomic
Agency Act and its amendments now have this effect because Congress,
through inaction, has allowed the states' technological ability to out-
strip their legal power. This congressional inaction has caused stan-
dards intended to insure basic safety protection to subvert their very
purpose. It is congressional negligence, both in drafting the original
legislation25 and in failing to continue to coordinate that legislation
with technology that frustrates state attempts to provide greater protec-
tion to their populations.
It is incongruous for Congress to allow states to prohibit nuclear
power for economic and environmental reasons but not for safety rea-
sons-for protection of property but not people. As a remedy, Con-
gress should change the law so as to allow states to condition the use of
nuclear power on safety as well as on economic factors.
255. See note 68 and accompanying text supra.
256. Id.
257. See note 70 supra.

